Sociality and money1

This is a translation of ‘Socialité et argent’, a text by Emmanuel Levinas originally published in 1987. Levinas describes the emergence of money out of interhuman relations of exchange and the social relations – sociality – that result. While elsewhere he has presented sociality as ‘nonindifference to alterity’ it appears here as ‘proximity of the stranger’ and points to the tension between an economic system based on money and the basic human disposition to respond to the face of the other person. Money both encodes and effaces sociality, both designates and disguises social relations. It arises from the way that needs and interests are manifested in exchange relations, in what he calls the ‘interestedness’ of economic life. But interests are always already cut through by the fact that being is always ‘being with others’. Being is always ‘interbeing’. Interestedness is always confronted by disinterestedness, that is, by a sociality marked by the ‘goodness of giving’, attachment to and concern for the poverty of the other person. Levinas concludes with a discussion of sociality and justice, posing questions about the tension between the demand to respond to an Other immediately before me and at the same time to respond to the demands of an other Other (the third person) who also invites a response.     

Cross-border restaurant price and exchange rate interactions

Purchasing power parity suggests that international price ratios for identical goods should approximate nominal exchange rates for the currencies in which the prices are denominated. Deviations of the price ratios from exchange rates can occur for a number of reasons and mixed evidence has been recorded for how long those deviations last. Empirical evidence for international restaurant prices in El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico confirms that menu item price ratios are strongly correlated with the peso/dollar exchange rate. An earlier exploratory study of eight individual products also indicated that half-life deviations in this market are very short. This study utilizes additional data from a larger and more extensive sample to examine if the prior results are confirmed.     

A Nonlinear Relationship: Unemployment and Economic Growth (Construction Sector) in Spain, 1995.1–2012.2

A quadratic version of the first-difference Okun’s Law model was estimated for Spain (1995.Q1-2012.Q2). An accelerationist version of Okun’s Law was obtained, which allowed us to calculate variable Okun coefficients as well as critical points in the relationship between construction sector growth and the variation in overall unemployment. The optimal economic growth rate was determined to be 7.38 %. By applying principal components, it is demonstrated that this sector led the economic process after 1995.     

Analysis of household attitudes toward the purchase of livestock products and fish in Cameroon

The need for additional information on household demand for meat and fish in Cameroon is addressed. Probit analysis involving the Heckman selectivity correction procedure is used to estimate the effects of individual and household characteristics on demand for beef, chicken, pork and fish. Results indicate that fish is a relative necessity in Cameroon and is often substituted for beef and chicken by households whose profiles include being of low income levels, having large household sizes, are of middle age and are less educated. Whereas chicken and pork substitute each other, they are each complementary to beef. The profiles of households likely to purchase beef include being married, middle age, educated and of the Muslim faith. Profiles for households most likely to increase their purchases of chicken include being of high income levels and are public sector employed. Some policy implications are provided.     

Structural breaks and GARCH models of stock return volatility: The case of South Africa

This paper investigates the empirical relevance of structural breaks in forecasting stock return volatility using both in-sample and out-of-sample tests applied to daily returns of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) All Share Index from 07/02/1995 to 08/25/2010. We find evidence of structural breaks in the unconditional variance of the stock returns series over the period, with high levels of persistence and variability in the parameter estimates of the GARCH(1,1) model across the sub-samples defined by the structural breaks. This indicates that structural breaks are empirically relevant to stock return volatility in South Africa. However, based on the out-of-sample forecasting exercise, we find that even though there structural breaks in the volatility, there are no statistical gains from using competing models that explicitly accounts for structural breaks, relative to a GARCH(1,1) model with expanding window. This could be because of the fact that the two identified structural breaks occurred in our out-of-sample, and recursive estimation of the GARCH(1,1) model is perhaps sufficient to account for the effect of the breaks on the parameter estimates. Finally, we highlight that, given the point of the breaks, perhaps what seems more important in South Africa, is accounting for leverage effects, especially in terms of long-horizon forecasting of stock return volatility.     

Cost-Reducing Investment, Competition, and Industry Dynamics

We demonstrate the possibility of shake-out of firms and emergence of interfirm heterogeneity along the (socially optimal) dynamic equilibrium path of a competitive industry with free entry and exit, even when there is no uncertainty and all firms are ex ante identical with perfect foresight. Atomistic firms with upward-sloping marginal cost curves undertake investment in firm-specific cost reduction. They earn negative net profits in early periods, compensated later by strictly positive net profits; no entry occurs after the initial time period. Some firms may exit before others even while other firms earn positive net profits.     

Gender-responsive budgeting: The case for Botswana

Various conferences on women's rights have identified a relationship between gender, power, decision-making and resource allocation. Considering it is a given that pockets of gender inequality in many developing countries, including Botswana, the women will always be disadvantaged in resource allocation. The disadvantage manifests itself in many fronts, particularly feminised poverty and HIV infection. Since the effects of the global financial crisis are not gender-neutral, women and girls, as vulnerable groups, must be protected by gender-responsive budgeting. This paper argues that while Botswana has chalked up some successes in gender equality initiatives, sufficiently instanced by the ratification of gender conventions, public budgeting largely lacks gender responsiveness. Since literature advocating for gender-responsive budgeting in Botswana is lacking, this paper attempts to fill the gap and encourage debate. Finally, it argues that such budgeting will ensure equality in resource allocation and also empower women.     

Banking inefficiency in Central and Eastern European countries under a quadratic loss function

We employ a quadratic loss function using a forward-looking rational expectations model to estimate the dynamics of banking inefficiency scores in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the period 1998–2005. Results show that there is heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium across countries and over time, while it appears that the recent accession to the EU has not led to an increase in the speed of adjustment, as it would be expected in light of the integration process prior to the accession. Ownership asserts certain influence on the speed at which banks correct past-period inefficiency.     

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity‐constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price‐quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price‐quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal collusion is attained with simple price‐quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding.