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141.
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.  相似文献   
142.
Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.  相似文献   
143.
This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.  相似文献   
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As managers and employees from different cultures begin to encounter one another in the workplace, the need arises to understand how organizational variables relate differentially based on one's culture. This study attempts to provide a preliminary examination of the relationship between stressors, sources of conflict and job commitment across two differing cultures, specifically the United States and Hong Kong. Although more similarities than differences between the two cultures were found, this study provides at least preliminary evidence that members of different cultures may perceive some stressors differently and exhibit different relationships between stressors and work attitudes.  相似文献   
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