Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach

A trade union is required to tax its own members to fund unemployment benefit paid to its unemployed members in an insider-outsider model of union bargaining over wages and employment. An increase in unemployment benefit imposed by the government increases employment overall but not necessarily the employment of insiders if the tax rate is exogenously fixed by the government.This paper has benefited from comments of Mick Common, Dipak Ghosh, Bob Hart, and Robin Ruffell. The comments of two anonymous referees and the advice of the Editor have greatly improved the presentation of the paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.     

OPPORTUNISTIC MATCHING IN THE HOUSING MARKET*

We construct a model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow values while searching. Agents enter the market relaxed (with high flow values) but move to a desperate state (low flow values) at a Poisson rate if they have not already transacted. We characterize the equilibrium steady‐state matching pattern and the joint distribution of price and time to sale (for sellers). The expected price conditional on time to sale falls with time spent on the market, whereas the conditional variance of price first rises and then falls with time on the market.     

Impacts of e-Commerce and Enhanced Information Endowments on Financial Services: A Quantitative Analysis of Transparency, Differential Pricing, and Disintermediation

Some implications of e-Commerce financial services firms are becoming clear. The web drives transparency, and increases the information endowment of all market participants. It is harder to manipulate customers' behavior, or to overcharge them. Transparency drives differential pricing. Not all customers can or should be charged the same prices. Transparency reduces the viability of cross-subsidies between customers can or between products. The differential pricing enabled by the web transforms distribution channels, and enables direct distribution and alternative forms of distribution. Some intermediateraries may be bypassed altogether, while others may rapidly lose their best, most profitable, and previously most loyal customers.     

Implied Volatility of Interest Rate Options: An Empirical Investigation of the Market Model

We analyze the empirical properties of the volatilityimplied in options on the 13-week US Treasury bill rate. These options havenot been studied previously. It is shown that a European style put optionon the interest rate is equivalent to a call option on a zero-coupon bond.We apply the LIBOR market model and conduct a battery of validity tests tocompare three different volatility specifications: contact, affine, and exponentialvolatility. It appears that the additional parameter in the affine and theexponential volatility function is not justified. Overall, the LIBOR marketmodel fares well in describing these options.     

Estimating the credibility of an exchange rate target zone

Recent breakthroughs in the theory of exchange rate target zones have not been followed by similar contributions on the empirical side. The drift adjustment method of evaluating the credibility of a target zone has become common practice. However, the estimates of the expected rate of depreciation inside the band do not model knowledge of the band in the agents' information set. In this paper, a rational expectations limited-dependent variable method to estimate the expected rate of depreciation is used to remedy this weakness. In the case of the franc-mark target zone with daily data covering a 4-year period, we show that expected rates of devaluation of the order of 2.5% were still present in the early 1990s. Their reappearance in the autumn of 1992 may thus not be surprising.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2005–2006. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Behavioral assumptions and theory development: the case of transaction cost economics

From a critical realist perspective, I discuss the role played by behavioral assumptions in organization theories, and use transaction cost economics as an illustrative example. Core behavioral assumptions often constitute the foundation of the mechanismic explanations of a theory, and thus should play a pivotal role in theory development. I distinguish between assumption‐based and assumption‐omitted theory testing, and show that empirical research in transaction cost economics has been dominated by assumption‐omitted testing. To establish a solid foundation for a new theory, management researchers should pay more attention to assumption‐based testing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.