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31.
Günter Dibbern 《保险科学杂志》2004,93(4):639-649
The compulsory health insurance fund in Germany is under huge cost pressure. The reasons are the demographic development and the proceeding medical-technical progress, which keep raising the expenses instead of reducing them. Seeing that financial means are getting scarce, there are multifaceted appendages of rationing the medical supply. New market potential arises, however, for the economy of private health insurance for which one can develop and offer answers. The contribution scetches which economic boarders the private health insurance needs to adhere to. 相似文献
32.
Michael T. Rauh 《European Economic Review》2004,48(6):1287-1300
In this paper, we study the effects of wage and price controls on employment, output, and welfare in a simplified version of the Bénabou (J. Econom. Theory 60 (1993) 140) equilibrium sequential search model with bilateral heterogeneity. We show that a price ceiling increases output but the change in welfare depends on three effects: the reduction in aggregate search costs, the increase in surplus due to increased output, and the transfer of production to the least efficient firm. The model is formally identical to a standard equilibrium search model of the labor market so analogous results hold for the minimum wage. 相似文献
33.
Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze priceformation and liquidity in a non-anonymous environment withsimilarities to the floor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis isthat the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probabilitythat a trader trades on the basis of private information. Heuses this knowledge to price discriminate. This can be achievedby quoting a large spread and granting price improvement totraders deemed uninformed. Consistent with our hypothesis wefind that price improvement reflects lower adverse selectioncosts but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit.Further, the quote adjustment following transactions at thequoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustmentafter transactions at prices inside the spread. Our resultsindicate that anonymity comes at the cost of higher adverseselection risk. JEL Classification: G10. 相似文献
34.
Darren T. Roulstone 《Journal of Accounting Research》2003,41(3):525-551
In this study I investigate the relation between firm‐level insider‐trading restrictions and executive compensation. Using a trading‐window proxy for the existence of such restrictions, I test predictions that insiders will demand compensation for these restrictions and that firms will need to increase incentives to restricted insiders. I find that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. Furthermore, these firms use more incentive‐based compensation and their insiders hold larger equity incentives relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading. These results hold after controlling for the endogenous decision to restrict insiders and are consistent with the notion that insider trading plays a role in rewarding and motivating executives. 相似文献
35.
Erik Theissen 《European Finance Review》2003,7(1):1-26
Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze price formationand liquidity in a non-anonymous environment with similarities to thefloor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis is that the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probability that atrader trades on the basis of private information. He uses this knowledgeto price discriminate. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and granting price improvement to traders deemed uninformed.Consistent with our hypothesis we find that price improvement reflects loweradverse selection costs but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit. Further, the quote adjustmentfollowing transactions at the quoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustment aftertransactions at prices inside the spread. Our results indicate that anonymity comes at the cost ofhigher adverse selection risk. 相似文献
36.
Robin T. Byerly Bruce T. Lamont Terrill Keasler 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2003,24(8):535-548
This study examined firm performance in market reaction to two types of business portfolio restructuring announcements: refocusing and repositioning. We predicted that market performance effects for these two types of strategic restructurers would be moderated by prior diversification posture. The theory behind these expectations was built on a general premise that restructuring strategy would be more favorably viewed by the market as performance enhancing when it offered greater potential for organizational transformation. Results showed strong support for our conclusion that prior diversification posture poses a significant contingency factor in restructuring firms' strategic choices. Further, the market tended to respond more favorably with this sample to repositioning restructuring choices. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
37.
A statistically optimal inference about agents' ex ante price expectations within the US broiler market is derived using futures prices of related commodities along with a quasi‐rational forecasting regression equation. The modelling approach, which builds on a Hamilton‐type framework, includes endogenous production and allows expected cash price to be decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated components. We therefore infer the relative importance of various informational sources in expectation formation. Results show that, in addition to the quasi‐rational forecast, the true supply shock, future prices, and ex post commodity price forecast errors have, at times, been influential in broiler producers' price expectations. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
38.
The pensions pillarisation agenda envisages a reduction in the role of social insurance while simultaneously advocating the parallel expansion of fully funded private sector, occupational and personal retirement contingencies. Widespread perception of looming state failure in the field of pensions delivery highlights the inherent limitations of current pension delivery arrangements. However, moves to de-emphasise the provision afforded by, predominantly, monopillar state-mandated pension systems by expanding private privision represent short-term palliative responses to deep rooted structural and demographic problems. Multipillar systems appear no more capable of guaranteeing system funding in the face of demographic ageing and structural unemployment than existing monopillar systems. Moreover, a diminished role for social insurance will leave the low paid and unemployed significantly more vulnerable in old age. Consequently, this paper argues for a pension reform agenda which, in terms of levels of income substitution, will secure an adequate social insurance element into the future. 相似文献
39.
40.
Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns. 相似文献