On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels

The conventional wisdom is that cartels which merely lead to lower production levels and higher prices are detrimental to social welfare. This paper explores the extent to which this is generally valid. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a hard core cartel that is beneficial for firms and society at large. Considering both strong (with side payments) and weak (without side payments) hard core cartel contracts, we find that (i) both strong and weak welfare-enhancing cartels exist when at least one firm makes a loss on part of its sales in competition, (ii) a welfare-enhancing strong cartel exists whenever there is a difference in unit cost at competitive production levels, and (iii) a welfare-enhancing weak cartel exists when the profit margin on all sales is positive and the cost difference is sufficiently large.     

Dynamics of regional unemployment rates in Brazil: Fractional behavior,structural breaks,and Markov switching

This paper investigates unemployment dynamics in Brazil and in its major metropolitan regions using a fractional integration model. Aspects regarding structural breaks and regime switches are discussed as well. To do that, the methods proposed by Hassler and Meller (2009) and Tsay and Härdle (2009) are used. The major results indicate that unemployment rates have two different levels of persistence. The first one is nonstationary whereas the second one is nonstationary but mean-reverting. Based on these findings, the convergence hypothesis of regional unemployment rates was tested. Following the fractional stochastic convergence criterion put forward by Mello and Guimaraes-Filho (2007), it was concluded that regional unemployment rates are convergent.