Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective

What if living in a relatively trustworthy society was sufficient to blindly trust strangers? In this paper we interpret generalized trust as a learning process and analyse the trust game paradox in light of the replicator dynamics. Given that trust inevitably implies doubts about others, we assume incomplete information and study the dynamics of trust in buyer-supplier purchase transactions. Considering a world made of ??good?? and ??bad?? suppliers, we show that the trust game admits a unique evolutionarily stable strategy: buyers may trust strangers if it is not too risky to do so. Examining the situation where some players may play either as trustor or as trustee we show that this result is robust.     

PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

Evaluating the Effect of Affinity Card Programs on Customer Profitability Using Propensity Score Matching

Affinity card programs have become popular in recent times and account for one fifth of all credit card accounts. There is no research that links affinity card programs to customer profitability. Moreover, little is known about what type of affinity card programs would lead to higher profit. Using a large proprietary dataset we answer the above questions. We also apply propensity score matching, a relatively new technique, to control for selection bias in addressing the above issues. Contrary to previous research and common belief, we show that affinity card customers are no more profitable than non-affinity card holders. We also show that sports-based affinity programs are the least profitable and surprisingly, alumni-based affinity programs also do poorly relative to other types of affinity. On the positive side, affinity card customers are lower risk and help to lower the average risk of the portfolio of customers.     

西方误读中国商道

中国文化相当多面和多变，商业文化也不例外，有三个方面最常被误读。 美国式个人主义：多年以来，中国似乎都是笼罩着浓厚集体主义的国家，但环境已经发生巨变。陈伟是一位巴黎奢侈品行业的经理，他不断亲身感受到中国个人主义的上升。     

Signalling with official interest rates: the case of the German discount and lombard rate

A major characteristic of the operating procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB) is its reliance on standing facilities. It is intended that the official rates on those facilities also serve the function of signalling. The case of Germany, where the Bundesbank followed a similar signalling strategy, is analysed. In particular the paper investigates whether announcements of official interest rates provide information not already contained in other policy measures and whether the resulting revisions of expectations are efficient. Significant differences are found between signalling in the case of increasing and decreasing interest rates.     

Inflation und Schuldenabbau

The European Central Bank (ECB) recently announced its willingness to do whatever is needed to save the euro. This has raised the question whether such a role of the ECB must lead to higher rates of infl ation. Under current recessive macroeconomic conditions in the eurozone, the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy will not lead to higher infl ation. On the contrary, there is a serious danger of defl ation. Higher infl ation would likely occur only if a permanent stabilisation function were assigned to the ECB. Yet historical examples show that mistakes can be made. During the stagnation in Japan, US economists heavily criticised the Bank of Japan’s timid monetary policy response. But in some sense, current Fed policy seems to be a direct copy of that strategy, caused by uncertainty about the proper communication channel. An infl ation tax could help to bring down the mounting public debt in the wake of the fi nancial crisis, but higher wealth taxes have more transparent distributional effects.     

Do watching eyes affect charitable giving? Evidence from a field experiment

The presence of implicit observation cues, such as picture of eyes, has been shown to increase generosity in dictator games, and cooperative behavior in field settings. I combine these approaches, by testing if a picture of watching eyes affects unconditional giving in a natural environment, where the recipient is a charity organization. Taken together, this study reduces the influence of three potential confounding factors in previous experiments: (i) experimenter demand effects, (ii) that the facial cue reminds subjects of a human counterpart, and (iii) a social multiplier effect. Specifically, the paper reports results from an experiment, conducted in a Swedish supermarket chain, where customers face a naturally occurring decision problem. People who recycle cans and bottles have to choose whether to keep the recycled amount or donate it to a charity organization. By posting a picture of human eyes on recycling machines, I am able to test whether this causes an increase in donations to the charity. Based on a sample covering a 12-day period, 38 stores and 16775 individual choices, I find no general effect. However, when controlling for store and day fixed effects, and using a proxy for store attendance, the picture of eyes increased donated amount by 30 percent during days when relatively few other people visited the store. This result gives further support to the conclusion that subtle social cues can invoke reputation concerns in humans, although the relatively small effect suggests that previous estimates could be biased upward, or at least that the influence of observational cues is context dependent.     

Markets as communication systems

As the information relative to endowments, costs and preferences is dispersed among many agents, the quality of resource allocation depends on the ability of markets to communicate information inside the economic system. Because information is transferred through negotiation and transaction behaviors, the network of trading relations defines the channels through which it flows. In the present study, we use new computational tools to analyze the performance of two wholesale trade institutions widely used around the world: network trading and marketplace trading. Whilst network trading and marketplace trading disseminate far fewer bits of information than a perfectly transparent benchmark market, they often manage to generate an allocation of resources that is almost as good. In many cases, network trading proves more effective than marketplace trading (contrary to a common preconception). This surprising performance of network trading is linked to a form of indirect arbitrage induced by connections between networks. Implications for market design and public policy making are presented, along with prospects for further research.     

How Sensitive Are Bank Managers to Shareholder Value?

We test for the existence of market discipline by shareholders of banks with a wide range of ownership structures. Discipline by shareholders manifests itself through monitoring banks’ level of risk as well as through influencing banks’ management actions. We find that shareholders utilize the relation between stock returns and different types of risk measures to monitor risky banks. Shareholders partially influence bank management by responding to decreasing stock returns with a demand to improve loan quality. Moreover, the influence on management in small banks is more pronounced compared to large banks.     

What can price volatility tell us about market efficiency? Conditional heteroscedasticity in historical commodity price series

The development in the working of markets has been an important topic in economic history for decades. The volatility of market prices is often used as an indicator of market efficiency in the broadest sense. Yet, the way in which volatility is estimated often makes it difficult to compare price volatility across regions or over time for two reasons. First, if prices are non-stationary, the variance is inflated. Second, the variance of commodity prices contains information on a number of region- and time-specific factors that are not related to market efficiency. Hence, the popular coefficient of variation and related indicators are not adequate measures of the efficiency of markets and are incomparable across regions. As a solution, we suggest using a conditional heteroscedasticity model to estimate the residual (conditional) variance of commodity prices. This measure reflects how markets react to unexpected events and can therefore be seen as a measure of market efficiency. Using this approach on grain prices from the Early Modern Pisa, Paris, Vienna, and Japan, we find that the residual price volatility had declined (and market efficiency increased) in the European markets in the late sixteenth century while it remained stable in Japan.