The impact of firm strategy and foreign ownership on executive bonus compensation in Japanese firms

Building on information-processing perspectives and the Japanese contextual factors, this study investigates the relationships between firm strategy and executive bonus pay as well as the moderating role of foreign ownership on the strategy-compensation relationship in Japanese firms. We focus on R&D investment and product diversification as strategy variables and investigate their direct effects on executive bonus pay. Further, we examine the moderating effects of foreign ownership on the strategy-pay sensitivity. The results, based on a sample of the 148 largest industrial firms in Japan for the 1990-1997 period, show that both R&D investment and product diversification are positively related to executive bonus pay. Our findings also indicate that foreign ownership negatively moderates the relationships between the strategy variables and executive compensation, suggesting that foreign investors play an active monitoring role, reducing cash bonus payments when their invested firms choose to increase R&D or pursue diversification strategy.     

Externalities in appropriation: responses to probabilistic losses

Using an appropriation game setting, we examine individual responses to changes in a groups’ vulnerability to a probabilistic loss (L) of a public good. The probabilistic loss parameter entails losing 10, 50 or 90% of the value of the public good that is maintained through cooperation, where the likelihood of the loss decreases in total group cooperation. By design, the expected marginal net benefits to an individual and the expected harm to others depends endogenously on the individuals’ expectations of group cooperation and exogenously on the magnitude of the loss parameter. We find that individual cooperation is greater when forecasts of total group cooperation are greater and where the magnitude of the probabilistic loss is larger. There is, however, an interesting asymmetry in responses by two subgroups. Subjects who are pessimistic regarding total group cooperation decrease cooperation the higher the magnitude of the probabilistic loss and their decisions are tied systematically to changes in their expectations of other’s cooperation. On the other hand, subjects who are optimistic regarding total group cooperation are found to be more cooperative, but their decisions are not systematically tied to changes in expectations of others’ cooperation.     

On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption

We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D10, J13.     

Optimal Reimbursement and Malpractice Sharing Rules in Health Care Markets

When health care sponsors such as HMOs or PPOs can use "utilization reviews" in order to indicate to the provider what type of treatment to administer to the patient based upon a diagnosis that is established by the provider, it is possible to implement the "first best" levels of investment in cost control efforts and in aggressiveness of treatment. The implementation of the "first best" requires the utilization of the prospective reimbursement rule accompanied by the removal of all malpractice liabilities from the provider. In contrast, when the type of treatment cannot be enforced by the payer, implementation of the "first best" is not feasible if the payer places a higher weight on the welfare of consumers than that of providers in its objective function. In this case, the reimbursement scheme deviates from the prospective rule, and the provider assumes liability to part of the cost incurred by society as a result of unsuccessful medical outcomes. When the payer can enforce treatment only partially by establishing bounds on the range of acceptable treatments, a minimal acceptable standard will be established and the outcome will be an intermediate case between the above two extremes.     

The Political Ecology of Virtual Water in Southern Spain

What does virtual water conceal? This article synthesizes political ecology with ecological economics to question the understanding of the scientific concept of virtual water as part of an independent objective reality, rather than as a construction supported by pre‐existing ideas. The discourse promoting both the concept of virtual water and the methodologies used to estimate virtual water flows is structured according to some underlying ideas that are framed within market logic and the rationality of international trade. Consequently, it produces a representation of water as a factor of production that does not challenge the hegemonic construction of water scarcity in nature, and proposes a water management system the main purpose of which is to maximize efficiency in the use of the resource. We reveal the ideas underlying the virtual water concept to show how a critical approach to ecological economics can be complemented by political ecology theories. In this article, we use epistemological reflection as a starting point, with the specific objective of contrasting this reflection with the reality of water in the horticultural sector of Almería (southern Spain), in order to bring to light those aspects made invisible through the use of the virtual water indicator in a concrete case study.     

Cutting the web of interests: Pitfalls of formalizing property rights

Property rights to land can be thought of as a web of interests, with many different parties having a right to use, regulate, or manage the resource, which may be based on a range of customary institutions or local norms as well as state law. These interests often play a critical role in livelihoods, social relations, and ecological functions. The formalization of property rights has historically led to a cutting of this web, creating more exclusive forms of rights over the resource. Drawing from case studies in Kenya the paper emphasizes the risk of excluding legitimate claimants in formalization processes that focus on individual titling. By collapsing all rights within individuals, such programs have negated the distinct multiple claims by women, youths, and seasonal users, among others. We examine ways in which formalization processes can secure diverse claims, and highlight the need for a better understanding of the social and ecological implications of existing land tenure before they are undermined by formalization.