Modeling international trade flows and market shares for agricultural commodities: a modified Armington procedure for rice

The Armington procedure (AP) has become increasingly popular in agricultural trade analyses. However, some arguments have arisen concerning the relevance of using the procedure for such analyses. This study examines the assumptions commonly made when using the Armington procedure and suggests modifications for agricultural trade analyses. Results from models utilizing rice-trade data suggest that the assumptions of the single constant elasticity, in particular, may not be appropriate for analyzing agricultural trade. These results also suggest that, with proper modifications, the AP can be applied to agricultural trade. Further, results of a modified Armington procedure indicate that trade in rice exports is highly competitive and that changes in market shares of individual exporters are not independent of changes in budget expenditure allocated to imports.     

Projecting Canadian Grain Shipments

The magnitude of future grain exports will profoundly affect many segments of the Canadian economy besides agriculture. Changes in structure of the existing grain transportation system, for example, may be required because of substantial increases in grain movement from country elevators to terminal positions. Grain trade projections are reviewed and the implications discussed. Results indicate that Canadian grain exports may increase from the past five-year average of 534 million bushels to a 1980 level of 811 million bushels and with the possibility of a billion bushel export level being achieved. All segments of the economy affected by the Canadian grain industry must be prepared to adjust their future operations to efficiently accommodate the increased level of grain exports .     

The Effectiveness of the U.K. Travel Allowance

This paper discusses a method for analyzing the pricing and production behaviour of a mature oligopoly, characterized by stable market shares and well established patterns of price leadership. The oligopoly utilized as an example is the US primary producers of copper. The paper develops three pricing/production strategies which are felt to be most relevant to the US primary producers. While one of these strategies (collusive monopolistic pricing) is more desirable to the oligopoly, the ability of the oligopoly to impose any of the strategies depends upon market conditions and government stockpile intervention. A generalized logit probability model is developed and estimated to indicate the effects of market conditions and government action upon the ability of the oligopoly to impose its desired pricing/production strategies.     

EFFECTS OF PRICE AND AVAILABILITY ON ABORTION DEMAND

Over 1.5 million legal abortions were performed in the United States in 1988. State-level regulation affecting the price or availability of abortion services may expand given recent Supreme Court decisions. This paper uses state-level data pooled over time to estimate abortion demand. Using single cross-sections of state data, past studies find abortion demand per 1,000 pregnancies to be price inelastic and find income elasticity to be positive and significant. The analysis here shows that price elasticity estimates in a single cross-section are sensitive to the choice of state characteristics used to control for "abortion attitudes" within a state. Ajixed-efects model design with pooled data gives more robust abortion demand price elasticity estimates. The results suggest that any new state regulations that increase the costs of obtaining abortions will reduce abortion use and increase unintended fertility .     

A financial planning model for presidential candidates

The necessity of entering a sequence of interrelated state primaries has forced presidential candidates to be much more deliberate in planning campaign finances. This paper presents a linear programming model for optimal allocation of time and money to each primary in order to maximize the number of delegates won. The model attempts to quantify and exploit the relationships between performance in early primaries and performance in later primaries, which has heretofore been labeled the “snowball effect.” Finally, the model, whose major use would be in overall strategic planning, is illustrated with an example.     

Equilibrium points in an urban retail model and their connection with dynamical systems

In this paper the application of results of dynamical system theory to urban retail models will be discussed. First of all attention is paid to the equilibria of these models; their existence and uniqueness as well as their stability. Next the results are aggravated to the situation of a two zonal system. Finally some economic consequences of parameter changes are described.     

Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: Refining the co-evolutionary multi-level perspective

This article investigates transitions at the level of societal functions (e.g., transport, communication, housing). Societal functions are fulfilled by sociotechnical systems, which consist of a cluster of aligned elements, e.g., artifacts, knowledge, markets, regulation, cultural meaning, infrastructure, maintenance networks and supply networks. Transitions are conceptualised as system innovations, i.e., a change from one sociotechnical system to another. The article describes a co-evolutionary multi-level perspective to understand how system innovations come about through the interplay between technology and society. The article makes a new step as it further refines the multi-level perspective by distinguishing characteristic patterns: (a) two transition routes, (b) fit–stretch pattern, and (c) patterns in breakthrough.     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.