Macro news and bond yield spreads in the euro area

This paper analyses the effects of newspaper coverage of macro news on the spread between the yield on the 10-year German Bund and on sovereign bonds in eight countries belonging to the euro area (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) using daily data for the period 1999–2014. The econometric analysis is based on the estimation of a VAR-GARCH model. The results can be summarized as follows. Negative news have significant positive effects on yield spreads in all GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries but Italy before September 2008; markets respond more to negative news, and their reaction has increased during the recent financial crisis. News volatility has a significant impact on yield spread volatility, the effects being more pronounced in the case of negative news and bigger in the most recent crisis period, especially in the GIIPS countries. Further, the conditional correlations between yield spreads and negative news increase in absolute value during the financial crisis (especially in the GIIPS countries), indicating a higher sensitivity of the former to the latter.     

A common trends model of UK core inflation

In this paper the long-run trend in RPI inflation (core inflation) for the UK over the 1961–1997 period is estimated within the framework of a multivariate common trends model which extends the bivariate VAR approach of Quah and Vahey (1995). In this context core inflation is directly linked to money and wage growth and interpreted as the long-run forecast of inflation from a small-scale, cointegrated macroeconomic system. First version received: September 1999/Final version received: October 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  We thank two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. Work on this paper was partially conducted when C. Morana was at Heriot-Watt University.     

Maxmin under risk

Summary. Let be a continuous and convex weak order on the set of lotteries defined over a set Z of outcomes. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given to guarantee the existence of a set of utility functions defined on Z such that, for any lotteries p and q, The interpretation is simple: a conservative decision maker has an unclear evaluation of the different outcomes when facing lotteries. She then acts as if she were considering many expected utility evaluations and taking the worst one. Received: January 19, 2000; revised version: December 20, 2000     

Training opportunities in monopsonistic labour markets

This paper studies the empirical relationship between the extent of monopsonistic power observed in occupational labour markets and the training opportunities available to workers in those markets; using data from the American National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979. The results reveal a positive and significant association between monopsony power and training availability. The estimated association is found to be stronger for individuals with a college degree, with longer tenure in their jobs, and higher wages. These results are consistent across several econometric specifications that control for time, occupation, and individual fixed effects.     

Did colonization matter for growth?: An empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa's underdevelopment

We investigate the impact of 20th-century European colonization on growth. We find that colonial heritage, as measured by the identity of the metropolitan ruler and by the degree of economic penetration, matters for the heterogeneity of growth performances in Africa. Colonial indicators are correlated with economic and sociopolitical variables that are commonly employed to explain growth and there are growth gains from decolonization. Colonial indicators also add significant explanatory power to worldwide growth regressions and are correlated with the Sub-Saharan Africa and the Latin America dummies.     

Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude

The objective of this paper is to show how ambiguity, and a decision maker (DM)'s response to it, can be modelled formally in the context of a general decision model. We introduce a relation derived from the DM's preferences, called “unambiguous preference”, and show that it can be represented by a set of probabilities. We provide such set with a simple differential characterization, and argue that it is a behavioral representation of the “ambiguity” that the DM may perceive. Given such revealed ambiguity, we provide a representation of ambiguity attitudes. We also characterize axiomatically a special case of our decision model, the “α-maxmin” expected utility model.     

Dynamic variational preferences

We introduce and axiomatize dynamic variational preferences, the dynamic version of the variational preferences we axiomatized in [F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, A. Rustichini, Ambiguity aversion, robustness, and the variational representation of preferences, Mimeo, 2004], which generalize the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141-153], and include the Multiplier Preferences inspired by robust control and first used in macroeconomics by Hansen and Sargent (see [L.P. Hansen, T.J. Sargent, Robust control and model uncertainty, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 60-66]), as well as the classic Mean Variance Preferences of Markovitz and Tobin. We provide a condition that makes dynamic variational preferences time consistent, and their representation recursive. This gives them the analytical tractability needed in macroeconomic and financial applications. A corollary of our results is that Multiplier Preferences are time consistent, but Mean Variance Preferences are not.     

On the Impact of “Callback” Competition on International Telephony

In this paper we build a simple three-country model to evaluate the impact of callback on international telephony. The effects on both accounting rates and collection prices are studied. Callback firms exploit arbitrage opportunities in collection prices among countries, rerouting calls that originate in countries with high prices for international phone calls via countries with low prices. Contrary to what is commonly perceived, we show that callback tends to magnify the distortions associated with the current accounting rate regime. In particular, callback puts upward pressure on low price countries accounting rates and on collection charges. Callback companies are assumed to enjoy a volume price discount on each rerouted call; we show that the larger the price discount offered to callback companies, the higher the prices for international calls in the country hosting callback.     

Asset pricing with endogenous aspirations

We develop the classical asset pricing analysis assuming that the representative agent is characterized by endogenous aspirations. The agent's aspirations at time t are given by a linear combination of the standard of living (habit) at time t (the "forward" part) and of the conditional expectation at t of the habit at the end of the agent's life (the "backward" part). With this process we capture the fact that the agent's preferences are affected by what he plans to do in the future. Under certain conditions, the risk premium turns out to be higher than that obtained with an additive expected utility when both the forward and the backward parts affect the utility negatively.     

Corporatism,policies and growth

We investigate whether corporatist wage setting and policy making institutions negatively affect a) the slope of the growth path of the economy, by yielding decisions that resist the introduction of technological progress; b) the position of the growth path, through higher transaction costs involved in the policy decision making process. The estimates reveal: a) a negative partial correlation between corporatism and growth; b) a robust correlation between growth, union pervasiveness and other policy regressors; c) no significant correlation between corporatism and output level.Received: October 1999, Accepted: October 2002, JEL Classification: J51, P41We wish to thank Sebastiano Bavetta, Domenico da Empoli, Ernesto Felli, Massimo Finoia, Gianluigi Galeotti, Kevin B. Grier, Alenka Kajzer, Hannelore Weck-Hanneman, the participants to the 1999 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society and to the seminars of the Center for Research on Economics of Institutions, as well as three anonimous referees for comments on previous versions of this paper. Financial support from the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, grant n. 98.01482.CT10 is gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveat applies.