An Estimation of the Impact of Oil Shocks on Crude Oil Exporting Economies and Their Trade Partners

This research evaluates the impact of oil price shocks on oil producing and consuming economies; we used a simultaneous equation framework for different countries with business relations. As expected, we found that oil-producers (here, Iran and Russia) benefit from oil price shocks. However contrary to previous findings, they also benefit from the indirect effect through their trade partners. For oil-consuming economies, the effects are more diverse. In some countries, output falls in response to an oil price shock, while some others seem to be relatively immune. Generally, those countries which trade more with oil producers gain indirect benefits via higher demand from oil-producers. For instance, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, the US, the UK, and China get a negative direct effect and positive indirect effect from oil producing countries. This is exactly the result that we anticipated. India has both negative effects directly and indirectly and seems to suffer more in a positive oil price shock. For Japan, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey the results are reversed. They benefit from an oil shock directly and indirectly.     

Theorems on correspondences and stability of the core

In this note two theorems strengthening Grodal's (1971) Theorem on correspondences are proved. The first drops the convexity assumption. The second strengthens that theorem further for the case when the range is the positive orthant. In this case, the conclusion of Grodal's Theorem - the intersection of the integral with the interior of the range being open- is modified to read as the integral being a relative open subset of the positive orthant. An example is provided to show that, such a strengthening is not valid in general. This allows us to dispense with the requirment of convexity of preferences in Grodal's (1971) theorems on the closedness of the set of Pareto optimal allocations, the core, and the continuity of the core correspondence for pure exchange economies. We apply this result to show that blocking coalitions in a large economy are stable. Received: September 30, 1998; revised version: September 18, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.