Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative

This paper proposes a regulatory mechanism for vertically related industries in which the upstream “bottleneck” segment faces significant returns to scale while other (downstream) segments may be more competitive. In the proposed mechanism, the ownership of the upstream firm is allocated to downstream firms in proportion to their shares of input purchases. This mechanism, while preserving downstream competition, partially internalizes the benefits of exploiting economies of scale resulting from an increase in downstream output. We show that this mechanism is more efficient than a disintegrated market structure in which the upstream natural monopoly bottleneck sets a price equal to average cost.     

Performance competition in local media markets

This paper investigates the impact of tax and public service performance on English local government popularity by using data on local property taxes, service performance ratings and local election results after the introduction of a system of evaluation of local government performance (Comprehensive Performance Assessment). The evidence emerging from estimation of a re-election equation offers a somewhat more rounded portrait of the voter than the conventional fiscal conservative icon, by highlighting the beneficial consequences of public service performance on government popularity and pointing to the role of local media networks (the BBC regional television, local radio and web network) in shaping consensus by spreading tax-related information.     

Push‐me pull‐you: comparative advertising in the OTC analgesics industry

We derive equilibrium incentives to use comparative advertising that pushes up own brand perception and pulls down the brand image of targeted rivals. Data on content and spending for all TV advertisements in Over‐The‐ Counter (OTC) analgesics enable us to construct matrices of rival targeting expenditures and estimate the structural model. Using brands' optimal choices, these attack matrices identify diversion ratios, from which we derive comparative advertising damage measures. We find that comparative advertising causes more damage to the targeted rival than benefit to the advertiser. We simulate banning comparative advertising to find industry profits rise.     

Public expenditure, international specialisation and agglomeration

It is widely recognised that public-sector purchasers tend to favour domestic suppliers. We study the consequences of such home-biased public procurement on international specialisation. Using a general-equilibrium model with a monopolistically competitive sector, we find that a country will specialise in that sector if it has relatively large home-biased procurement (the “pull” effect). Furthermore, home-biased procurement can counter agglomeration forces in that sector and thereby attenuate the overall degree of international specialisation (the “spread” effect). Our empirical analysis, conducted on input-output data for the European Union, yields supporting evidence for the pull effect and some support for the spread effect.     

Counting combinatorial choice rules

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso–Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents—which has positive implications for the Gale–Shapley algorithm of matching theory.     

Immigration,remittances and business cycles

Using data on border enforcement and macroeconomic indicators from the U.S. and Mexico, we estimate a two-country business cycle model of labor migration and remittances. The model matches the cyclical dynamics of unskilled migration, and documents the insurance role of remittances in consumption smoothing. Over the cycle, immigration increases with the expected stream of future wage gains, but it is dampened by a sunk emigration cost. Migration barriers slow the adjustment of the stock of immigrant labor, enhancing the volatility of unskilled wages and remittances. Changes in border enforcement have asymmetric welfare implications for the skilled and unskilled households.     

Outsourcing versus integration at home or abroad and firm heterogeneity

This paper analyzes the location (at home or abroad) and the mode of organization (outsourcing versus integration) of intermediate inputs production, using data on a sample of Italian manufacturing companies and focusing on the role of firm heterogeneity. We find evidence of a productivity ordering where foreign integration is chosen by the most productive firms and domestic outsourcing is chosen by the least productive firms; firms with medium-high productivity choose domestic integration, firms with medium-low productivity choose foreign outsourcing.     

When the light shines too much: Rational inattention and pandering

Should voters always pay attention to politics? I explore the role of endogenous costly attention allocation in politics, combining insights from the growing literature on rational inattention with a standard model of political agency. I show that when attention to the action of the politician is endogenous, voters may choose to pay too much attention in equilibrium, and this induces too much political pandering. Moreover when attention to the action and to the state of the world are both endogenous, voters may not pay enough attention the state with respect to the ex ante optimum. A reduction in the total cost of attention does not correct this inefficiency and can even reduce welfare. This model can be a demand‐driven explanation of the under‐provision of analytical contents by news channels.     

PLAYING THE FERTILITY GAME AT WORK: AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF PEER EFFECTS

We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register‐based data on fertile‐aged women working in medium‐sized establishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low‐education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.