When Less is More: Distinguishing Between Entrepreneurial Choice and Performance

This paper uses NCDS data on individual characteristics to distinguish determinants of entrepreneurial choice, income and job generation. A new model of utility from self-employment shows that relaxing liquidity constraints could inhibit performance. Empirically, we find that a range of inheritance enhances the performance of the self-employed and increases self-employment; while higher education also increases self-employment income and job creation, but reduces the probability of self-employment. Combining these choice and performance effects, we find that education has a positive net effect on job creation, as does inheritance up to a certain threshold.     

Participation and division of labour: a West German case study

Motivation and productivity were increased when the traditional division of labour and surplus was modified to give workers extended tasks and profit-shares in firm Z. In X, traditional division of labour combined with worker-shareholding and formal, representative participation failed to improve motivation.     

Bestimmungsgründe der internationalen Wanderungen europäischer Arbeitskräfte in der Gegenwart

Ohne ZusammenfassungMit 3 Textabbildungen     

Services Policy Reform and Economic Growth in Transition Economies

Major changes have occurred in the structure of former centrally planned economies, including a sharp rise in the share of services in GDP, employment, and international transactions. However, large differences exist across transition economies with respect to services intensity and services policy reforms. We find that reforms in policies toward financial and infrastructure services, including telecommunications, power, and transport, are highly correlated with inward FDI. Controlling for regressors commonly used in the growth literature, we find that measures of services policy reform are statistically significant explanatory variables for the post-1990 economic performance of transition economies. These findings suggest services policies should be considered more generally in empirical analyses of economic growth. JEL no. F14, F43, O14, O40     

Auf der Suche nach der versteckten Arbeitslosigkeit!

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Distortionary taxation and the free-rider problem

This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule which takes into account that a distortionary Ramsey-tax system is used to finance public-goods provision. Individuals have private information about their public-goods preferences. Moreover, individuals differ in their productive abilities. The incidence of taxation in the Ramsey model implies that more productive individuals have a lower willingness to pay for public goods than less productive individuals. They are therefore tempted to understate their valuation of public goods and less productive individuals are inclined to exaggerate theirs. The paper characterizes an optimal rule for taxation and public-goods provision that eliminates these biases.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate the extent to which party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The data set includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far‐reaching institutional reform that entirely re‐distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. The results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co‐partisanship) drive short‐term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left‐wing local governments run higher deficits than their right‐wing counterparts; left‐wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right‐wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.     

Political relationships,global financing,and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia

This study examines the role of political connections in firms’ financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms’ financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.     

Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games

Experimental Economics - We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3?×?3 one-shot games. To facilitate strategic thinking, we design a ‘structured’...