An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.     

通货膨胀的各种成因及其在我国的实证分析

本文不仅总结了当前主要的实证研究文献提出的我国通货膨胀的种种成因,而且对每种原因给予了比较分析和新的实证分析,并在此基础上尝试进行了综合分析,以得出一些有益的结论。     

R&D–Marketing Integration Mechanisms, Communication Flows, and Innovation Success

Rudy Moenaert, William Souder, Arnoud De Meyer, and Dirk Deschoolmeester report the results of their study of forty technologically innovative Belgian companies to examine the interaction between marketing and R&D. They studied one commercially successful and one commercially unsuccessful technological product innovation project in each participating company and collected data from one marketing and one R&D respondent per project. Communication flows between marketing and R&D are increased under conditions involving formalization of projects, decentralization, positive interfunctional climate, and role flexibility.     

Competition Among Universities and the Emergence of the Élite Institution

We consider an environment where two education institutions compete by selecting the proportion of their funding devoted to teaching and research and the criteria for admission for their students, and where students choose whether and where to attend university. We study the relationship between the cost incurred by students for attending a university located away from their home town and the equilibrium configuration that emerges in the game played by the universities. Symmetric equilibria, where universities choose the same admission standard, only exist when the mobility cost is high; when the mobility cost is very low, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. For intermediate values of the mobility cost, only asymmetric equilibria may exist; the final section of the paper provides an example where asymmetric equilibria do indeed exist for a plausible and robust set of parameters.     

Inflation dynamics in Kazakhstan1

In January 1992, Kazakhstan initiated a reform programme to move towards market-determined prices. The price liberalization process was characterized by large relative price shifts and an increase in the overall price level towards those observed in market economies. The paper shows how the piecemeal manner in which prices were liberalized resulted in strong relative price variability over a prolonged period of time, against a background of high inflation. Convergence towards international relative and absolute price levels has progressed but is not complete, with prices for energy and services in particular still below market economy levels.     

Employment response to supply and demand shocks under envy in wage formation

Summary We analyse the impact of wage envy on employment and on its sectorial allocation. A multi-sector general equilibrium model in which externalities among sectors arise through wage envy and decentralized bargaining is presented. In the no externality case, sectorial employment is a function of sectorial productivity and of the disutility of work. In the externality case, sectorial employment is additionally affected by union power in all sectors (with a negative sign even though bargaining is efficient), by the productivity in the other sectors (with an undetermined sign) and by the relative average propensity to consume goods of this sector (with a positive sign).Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, FNRS and Université Catholique de Louvain. I would like to thank Franz Palm for valuable comments on an earlier draft. This paper benefitted also from discussions with Torben Andersen, Jacques Drèze and Henri Sneessens (without implying them in any mistake). The detailed comments of the anonymous referee contributed to a large extent to clarify the exposition of the model.     

Technology Transfer and Learning

Despite the fact that international technology transfer has been widely studied its management still encounters many difficulties. To fully understand the issues that are relevant to the process of transferring production technology, it is necessary to determine the important factors that influence this process. Learning curves are often used as a means of determining the time required to become familiar with a transferred technology. The cases discussed in this paper have all employed learning curves, which were established at the outset of the transfer process and which turned out to be incorrect. As a consequence the envisaged efficiencies were not obtained. This phenomenon is partly due to the fact that when technology is transferred to a relatively inexperienced 'destination company', the curve is established based on the circumstances of the 'source company'. The case study findings lead to the conclusion that to establish a realistic curve a more comprehensive method is required than simply basing anticipated performance on that achieved at the source company.     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Towards collective business action and cross-sector collaboration in responsible competitiveness clusters in southern Africa

Responsible competitiveness clusters are cross-sector collaboration initiatives focused on identifying and acting upon synergies between sustainable development and economic competitiveness objectives. By means of three case studies in southern Africa this paper investigates the incentives, opportunities and challenges encountered in the emergence of such clusters. The first case study focuses on a regional response to the development challenges encountered in a South African mining area, the second describes efforts to make the Malawian agriculture sector more inclusive and competitive and the third discusses options for enhancing the competitiveness of the Lesotho textile sector. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role of international trade networks, the institutional framework, public sector support and internal governance processes as key factors influencing the initial level of success of these initiatives.     

The Recognition and Timing of Deferred Tax Liabilities

Abstract:   This paper examines the characteristics of firms that account for deferred tax liabilities related to government investment grants under an extended adoption timing period. Not only the recognition but also the timing decision is associated with changes in future performance and changes in the debt structure. Recognisers outperform non‐recognisers in the future, while early recognition is related to post recognition performance but only for those firms that currently perform well. Changes in the balance sheet structure are also related to both decisions. Firms with recent increases in the debt level tend to postpone recognition, while currently well‐performing firms that increase their future debt level are less likely to recognise deferred taxes.