(Un)expected retirement and the consumption puzzle

In this work we revisit the retirement consumption puzzle using Italian panel data. As emphasised in the literature, the observed consumption drop might be due to unexpected wealth shocks at retirement which modify optimal consumption plans. Using an Euler equation approach, we test the impact of unexpected retirement on the consumption patterns of individuals around the age of retirement by using the panel component of the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This dataset contains information on the expected age of retirement which can be used to distinguish between expected and unexpected retirement. Furthermore, we investigate the heterogeneous behaviour of individuals with different levels of education and wealth. We find evidence of a consumption drop at retirement especially for low educated people and individuals with little wealth. The consumption drop at retirement, on average, does not seem to be a response to unexpected retirement. Disaggregating our sample, we find that the consumption drop persists among low educated people with little wealth available, irrespective of whether retirement was expected or not. Highly educated people, conversely, do smooth their consumption, unless they have low wealth and are hit by an unexpected shock at retirement in which case they are forced to drop consumption.     

Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

This paper examines how the presence of an antitrust authority (AA) affects market‐sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other’s markets. The set of agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This paper shows that in the absence of an AA, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, and in the presence of an AA, more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a procompetitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.     

The Role of a Firm’s Net Cash Payouts in Leland’s (1994) Model

We study the effects of introducing payouts on corporate debt and optimal capital structure in a structural credit risk model à la Leland (1994) . We find that increasing the payout parameter not only affects the endogenous bankruptcy level, which is decreased, but modifies the magnitude of a change on the endogenous failure level as a consequence of an increase in risk‐free rate, corporate tax rate, riskiness of the firm and coupon payments. This simple analytical framework is able to capture realistic insights about optimal leverage, spreads and default probabilities more in line with historical norms (if compared to Leland’s results) and closer to predictions obtained through more sophisticated models.     

Rethinking liquidity creation: Banks,shadow banks and the elasticity of finance

In this article, the authors use the concept of the hierarchy of money found in the works of Minsky (2008 Minsky, H. [1986]2008. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Google Scholar][1986]), Foley (1987 Foley, D. 1987. “Money in Economic Activity.” In The New Palgrave: Money, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, 519–525. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Wray (1990 Wray, L. R. 1990. Money and Credit in Capitalist Economies: The Endogenous Money Approach. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar. [Google Scholar]), and Bell (2001 Bell, S. 2001. “The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (2):149–63.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) to analyze the process of liquidity creation in modern capitalist economies where shadow banks play an active role. They abandon the narrow focus on banks as the creators of money as well as the idea that nonbank financial institutions are mere intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Instead, the authors demonstrate that, similar to banks, nonbank financial institutions and foreign banks (through their cross-border activities) create liquidity endogenously by leveraging over the liabilities of entities hierarchically above them. The authors further elucidate Kregel’s concept of “fictitious” liquidity in the context of the hierarchy of financial liabilities, distinguishing it from “true” liquidity. By bringing shadow banks and the euro-currency markets into to the pyramid of financial liabilities, they develop a more complete framework of liquidity creation in modern capitalist economies. Their “extended” pyramid is useful for analyzing not only the fragility that may arise from the interactions between firms, households and banks, but also that which may originate through the interactions between banks, shadow banks and foreign banks.