Strategy for lifelong learning in vocational schools of tourism education

Learning is the accumulated knowledge acquired from the experiences of individuals. Lifelong learning concept for adult learners is vital to reveal and sustain their knowledge creation experience. Lifelong Learning can be defined as the ability to develop an individual’s skills, knowledge and skills social, individual, and professional. This study addresses the concept of lifelong education. Lifelong education is provided through informal, formal and non-formal education processes. This research relies on documentary analysis. It was applied the key arguments for the research focus. The relationship between technology and lifelong learning is becoming more important. The importance of lifelong learning in tourism education is increasing. The vocational school can create lifelong opportunities for the tourism industry. These research explained that some perspectives of lifelong learning; such as dimensions, benefits and barriers. Additionally, the chapter proposes a perspective on the lifelong learning strategy in tourism education and discuss concept of lifelong learning, in regard to the literature. It is the most important factor that reflects the training and professional development of the staff and the competitive power of the tourism product directly and indirectly. Vocational schools should develop programs in line with the expectations of tourism enterprises.     

Inequality of Opportunity in Brazil: A Corrigendum

This note acknowledges and corrects a programming error in our paper “Inequality of Opportunity in Brazil” (Review of Income and Wealth, 53(4), 585–618, 2007). Once the error is corrected, our bounds approach to the identification of individual model parameters in the presence of omitted variable biases is much less useful than indicated in the original paper. In the specific context of the measurement of inequality of opportunity, this implies that the decomposition of overall inequality of opportunity into direct and indirect effects is not reliable. However, the parametric approach introduced in our paper remains useful for obtaining a lower‐bound estimate of overall ex‐ante inequality of opportunity, as proposed by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).     

Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia

We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected.     

Service quality,scale economies and ownership: an econometric analysis of water supply costs

Issues related to service quality are crucial for water utility management and regulation. Omitting these aspects, especially when they are treated as exogenous, can lead to large biases in estimating cost functions as well as to misleading information concerning technology. In this article, we integrate the output multi-dimension in the cost function, considering delivered water volume and service quality as being endogenous. Network-related scale measures and private versus public ownership are investigated with the objective of evaluating how endogenous quality may affect their impact on costs. A translog cost model is estimated from a dataset of US water utilities. It is shown that including the quality level of the delivered services has a significant impact on scale economies and ownership effects. Significant economies of scope confirm the existence of trade-offs between water production and service quality.     

A live experiment on approval voting

This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes. JEL Classification C93, D70, D72     

Over-savings and hyperbolic discounting

Hyperbolic discounting models are widely seen as implying that consumers do not save enough, in accordance with the observed low rates of savings of some households. This paper qualifies this view by showing that hyperbolic consumers may ‘oversave’ in the short run. The result extends to uncertainty on future income and does not depend on whether preferences are present-biased or future-biased. A generalized comparative statics analysis of self-control is introduced, and its relationship to the analysis of uncertainty on discount factors is emphasized.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Relevance of corruption on the effect of public health expenditure and taxation on economic growth

We investigate whether corruption distorts the positive effect of public health expenditure and taxation on growth through panel data analysis of 75 developing countries for the period from 1995 to 2014. The findings indicate that, although both public health expenditure and taxation can increase economic growth, in countries with more corrupt governments this effect is reduced.