The Economics of Farm Fragmentation: Evidence from Ghana and Rwanda

Farm fragmentation, in which a household operates more thanone separate parcel of land, is a common phenomenon in Sub-SaharanAfrica. Concerned by the perceived costs of fragmented as opposedto consolidated holdings, several countries have implementedland consolidation programs. But these interventions overlookthe benefits that land fragmentation can offer farmers in managingrisk, in overcoming seasonal labor bottlenecks, and in bettermatching soil types with necessary food crops. This articleuses household data from Ghana and Rwanda to discuss the incidenceand causes of fragmentation. It then formally tests the relationbetween fragmentation and land productivity and risk reduction.The conclusion is that consolidation programs are unlikely tolead to significant increases in land productivity and may actuallymake farmers worse off. Policymakers should focus instead onreducing the root causes of fragmentation: inefficiencies inland, labor, credit, and food markets.     

Thomas Jefferson on the repudiation of public debt

Thomas Jefferson's theory of public debt repudiation illustrates both the normative and positive aspects of public debt repudiation. Using Jefferson's model, this paper attempts to reveal several characteristics of public debt repudiation. First, that the positive characteristics of repudiation can not be analyzed apart from the normative and institutional issues. Second, how a debt repudiation rule might be incorporated into a country's constitution and, finally, how such a rule may lead to an improvement of the country's credit terms over those that would exist otherwise. In other words, a country may be better off announcing its standards for repudiation then if it denied any intention to repudiate under any conditions. A related issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is the sufficient conditions for repudiation. Jefferson's model develops only the necessary conditions. I would like to thank J. Richard Aronson, Wayne Brough, Dean Crawshare, James Dearden, Kenneth Greene, Vince Munley, the anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the 1990 Public Choice Society meetings and at Lehigh University for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, the author is responsible for any errors. The author is grateful to The Martindale Center for the Study of Private Enterprise which supplied research support.     

Are There Differential Effects of Price and Policy on College Students’Drinking Intensity?

This article investigates the impact of campus bans on alcohol use and the price of alcohol on college students'drinking intensity. The impact of a campus ban on drinking appears to depend on the ability of students to substitute off-campus access to alcohol for on-campus access. Where few off-campus alternatives exist, campus bans reduce the odds that a student becomes a heavy drinker but have no impact on the odds of transitioning from abstainer to drinker. Where off-campus alternatives are more plentiful, campus bans are less effective. Increasing the price of alcohol appears to be equally effective at reducing the likelihood of drinking and heavy drinking. (JEL)     

Incentives and targets in hospital care: Evidence from a natural experiment

Performance targets are commonly used in the public sector, despite their well known problems when organisations have multiple objectives and performance is difficult to measure. It is possible that such targets may work where there is considerable consensus that performance needs to be improved. We investigate this possibility by examining the response of the English National Health Service to high profile waiting time targets. We exploit a natural policy experiment between two countries of the UK (England and Scotland) to establish the global effectiveness of the targets. We then use a within-England hospital analysis to confirm that responses vary by treatment intensity and to control for differences in resources which may accompany targets. We find that targets met their goals of reducing waiting times without diverting activity from other less well monitored aspects of health care and without decreasing patient health on exit from hospital.     

On the size of fiscal multipliers: A counterfactual analysis

We point out that fiscal multipliers derived from SVAR-models include the predicted future path of policy instruments. After the initial shock, net taxes and government expenditures react to each other and are autocorrelated. In a counterfactual simulation, we report fiscal multipliers that abstract from these dynamic responses.     

An alternative approach for portfolio performance evaluation: enabling fund evaluation relative to peer group via Malkiel’s monkey

We propose an implementable portfolio performance evaluation procedure that compares a portfolio with respect to the portfolios constructed by an infinite number of Malkiel’s blindfolded monkeys, or equivalently the whole enumeration of all possible portfolios. We argue that this approach exhibits two main advantages. First, it does not require any benchmark portfolios because a portfolio is being compared to an infinite number of portfolios. Second, it is market condition invariant. Since the market conditions are already reflected in the portfolio performances of an infinite blindfolded monkeys, our measure of portfolio performances is invariant to volatile market conditions.     

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.