Newer cardiac imaging techniques: multidetector CT angiography

An update of new developments with multidetector computed tomography (MDCT) coronary angiography is presented. Similar to what has occurred with the introduction of other new technologies such as electron beam computed tomography (EBCT), life insurance medical directors are expected to evaluate a technology before there are sufficient data from large clinical trials. Well-performed studies of the performance of MDCT coronary angiography have only recently appeared. MDCT appears to perform well for excluding significant coronary disease, and will perhaps be useful in emergency room "rule-out" situations. Other applications may be for the diagnosis of significant coronary obstruction (> 75% stenosis), as well as for the evaluation of bypass grafts. Limitations include the requirement for radiologic contrast administration and significant radiation exposure. MDCT does not provide information on atheroma morphology. Given these limitations, MDCT coronary angiography utilization will grow, and it will prove to be a useful tool in specific situations.     

Econometrics and inconsistencies in the national accounts

Economic data are typically inconsistent with national accounting identities, contain measurement errors and are sometimes unavailable. A generalized conditioned least square procedure for the adjustment of data is proposed to deal with these problems. It is shown how the resulting data may be used for FIML estimation of the parameters of dynamic models (and the data themselves) with the aid of the Kalman-Bucy filter. An illustrative application of the proposed techniques to UK data is reported.     

Accounting Quality in Eastern Europe after Communism

Research Question/Issue: This study, in the taxonomy of Schiehll and Martins (2016 Schiehll, E. and H. C. Martins. 2016. Cross-national governance research: A systematic review and assessment. Corporate Governance: An International Review 24 (3):181–99. doi:10.1111/corg.12158.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), examines cross-national corporate governance, within their “legal” category. It rests on the understanding that to fully grasp corporate governance it is essential to understand the embedded institutions. The research question is: Does an increase in legal quality cause an associated increase in the quality of corporate governance in the form of financial reports to investors? If so, this supports the fundamental importance of legal systems to earnings quality. Reliable evidence on whether there is an association between legal quality and financial reporting quality would be an empirical association showing that where legal quality is higher, earnings quality is also higher, and conversely.

Research Findings/Insights: The results show clearly that in 2005 and 2010, when adequate data are available for testing, earnings quality is poor: far more companies show small gains than small losses. A great deal of managerial discretion is exercised in arriving at accounting figures, since many amounts depend on forecasts of future events. A significant number of firms use that latitude to show positive earnings. As to patterns of earnings management among three clusters of countries, the small number of firms generally precludes strong statistically supported evidence of management within the clusters. Nevertheless, the whole is the sum of the parts, and the parts (clusters) indicate the clusters most responsible for the overall result. There is little evidence of small gains exceeding small losses in the Baltics, greater differences in the Visegrád countries, and big differences in southern Europe.

Theoretical/Academic Implications: Based on both (a) the historical background of legal systems and (b) attitudes concerning legal quality measured at the same time as the earnings measures, the accounting results are consistent with the prediction of a strong legal culture driving effective corporate governance.

Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results show that eastern firms, on aggregate, have yet to reach the level of their western counterparts. However, the differences do not seem highly significant, and indicate that convergence is close in this area. This, in turn, should guide and encourage legislators in their work.     

The Information Content of Productivity Measures: an International Comparison*

This study examines whether, and to what extent, productivity information is used by the market and whether it is useful as a predictive measure. To see if nationality has any bearing on these issues, we examine the information content of productivity measures in Japan, Korea and the United States. While correlations between security returns, productivity changes and unexpected earnings are not uniform across our sample countries, our findings suggest that productivity, as a performance metric, merits greater attention by financial managers and security analysts. The substitution of productivity in place of short-run earnings could very well be the key to enhanced performance in today's environment of global competition.     

MEASURING RISK AVERSION: ALLOCATION,LEVERAGE, AND ACCUMULATION

The risk-asset ratio that measures Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion reflects a multidimensional risk behavior. The risk-asset ratio is decomposed into the product of ratios that measure portfolio allocation between riskless and risk assets, use of financial leverage, and accumulation of wealth in marketable form. The three dimensions are less sensitive to the definition of wealth than is the composite risk-asset ratio. Constant relative risk aversion can be characterized by offsetting changes in the three dimensions as wealth changes.     

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective*

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.