A survey on pickup and delivery problems

This paper is the first part of a comprehensive survey on pickup and delivery problems. Basically, two problem classes can be distinguished. The first class, discussed in this paper, deals with the transportation of goods from the depot to linehaul customers and from backhaul customers to the depot. This class is denoted as Vehicle Routing Problems with Backhauls (VRPB). Four subtypes can be considered, namely the Vehicle Routing Problem with Clustered Backhauls (VRPCB – all linehauls before backhauls), the Vehicle Routing Problem with Mixed linehauls and Backhauls (VRPMB – any sequence of linehauls and backhauls permitted), the Vehicle Routing Problem with Divisible Delivery and Pickup (VRPDDP – customers demanding delivery and pickup service can be visited twice), and the Vehicle Routing Problem with Simultaneous Delivery and Pickup (VRPSDP – customers demanding both services have to be visited exactly once). The second class, dealt with in the second part of this survey, refers to all those problems where goods are transported between pickup and delivery locations. These are the Pickup and Delivery Vehicle Routing Problem (PDVRP – unpaired pickup and delivery points), the classical Pickup and Delivery Problem (PDP – paired pickup and delivery points), and the Dial-A-Ride Problem (DARP – passenger transportation between paired pickup and delivery points and user inconvenience taken into consideration). Single as well as multi vehicle versions of the mathematical problem formulations are given for all four VRPB types, the corresponding exact, heuristic, and metaheuristic solution methods are discussed.      

UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.     

Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

We test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers     

Financial Reporting Quality in Private Equity Backed Companies: The Impact of Ownership Concentration

We empirically show on a sample of 270 unquoted, private equity backed companies that the shareholder structure of private companies impacts the quality of their publicly available accounting information. More precisely, companies in which private equity (PE) investors have a high equity stake produce lower quality accounting information than companies in which PE investors have a low equity stake, after controlling for factors like company size and age. We explain our findings by arguing that PE investors with low equity stakes have a higher need for high quality accounting information whereas PE investors with high equity stakes have other means to closely monitor their portfolio companies. This paper has benefited form discussions with workshop participants at the Max Planck Institute. We specifically want to thank Lorraine Uhlaner and Mike Wright (guest editors), two anonymous referees as well as ignace De Beelde, Wouter De Maeseneire, Marc Deloof, Miguel Meuleman and Lloyd Steier for helpful suggestions. Part of this research was completed when Christof Beuselinck was an FWO Scholar at Ghent University. Financial support from the Fonds of Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Grant G.0012.02) is kindly appreciated. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Linking HRM and Small Business Performance: An Examination of the Impact of HRM Intensity on the Productivity and Financial Performance of Small Businesses

Attempts to explore empirically the link between HRM and firm performance are numerous. Yet, research on this link remains restricted to large companies. Little is known about the extent to which the existing results extend to small businesses. The purpose of the present study is to develop and test a conceptual framework linking HRM to financial performance that fits small businesses. The central question is whether the development of an intensive HRM is profitable for smaller organizations. For the development and optimization of the conceptual framework, we rely on human capital theory and bankruptcy prediction models. Using structural equation modeling, we study the mediating effect of voluntary turnover and productivity on the relationship between HRM intensity and one year lagged financial performance. The results show both productivity and profitability enhancing effects as well as a cost increasing impact of HRM intensity.     

Balancing budget through tax increases or expenditure cuts: is it neutral?

Fiscal adjustment currently ranks at the top in the economic policy agenda of many OECD countries, and not only those European countries aiming to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. Recently, Alesina and Perotti argued that successful cases of fiscal adjustment resulted from cutting expenditures, while those focusing on tax increases were unsuccessful. The paper, using a bivariate VECM representation for the joint government revenue–government expenditure dynamics for five of the main OECD countries, provides two contributions to this issue. First, it proposes and performs a neutrality test of the alternative adjustment strategies (through revenue or expenditures), second it characterizes the departure from neutrality in the three countries where the neutrality hypothesis is rejected. The conclusion, prevailing for these three countries, is that adjustment through taxes not only is inefficient, but even results in a perverse effect with induced extra expenditures which more than offset the increase in government revenue.