Punishment in environmental protection

The fundamental character of a punishment is the subject of this paper. Based on the assumed function of a punishment (deterrent), a punishment has to be perceived and experienced to be an adverse result by the punished and the public. The first factor in particular means that the courts have to have flexibility to sentence a person to such a punishment that is experienced as such. The legal question becomes how this customization of a punishment is acceptable from an equality standpoint. In the field of environmental protection, the administrative process poses serious problems. There may be administrative proceedings that result in substantial economic losses for individuals and groups alike. Jürgen S. Poesche was born in Edmonton (Alberta, Canada), lived in Europe and North America and graduated from the Helsinki University of Technology, University of Helsinki, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration and Tampere University of Technology. Areas of interest include chemical and mechanical pulping, environmental protection (EIA, environmental ethics, environmental law), and capital investment decision-making. He has published in, e.g., Wochenblatt für Papierfabrikation, Finnish Journal of Business Economics, Ympäristojuridiikka (Environmental Law), and in the publication series of the Helsinki University of Technology and the Tampere University of Technology. Presently, he is working for a major Canadian forest products company.     

Evidence on the motivation for management forecasts of corporate earnings

A multivariate model of the process by which managers decide to release public forecasts of their firms' earnings is developed, based on factors that are hypothesized to affect the demand for and the willingness to supply such forecasts. We test the model on data from a comprehensive sample of earnings forecasts, and find support for our hypotheses about the likely joint influence of those factors. Larger firm size, greater leverage, higher and more stable earnings rates and less rapid growth rates are found to be associated with an increased propensity for management to provide earnings forecasts for their firms.     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.     

Options on bond futures: Isolating the risk premium

The introduction of unspanned sources of risk (and frictions) implies that option prices include a risk premium. Prima facie evidence of the existence of risk premia in option prices is contained in the implied volatility smile patterns reported in the literature. This article isolates the risk premium (defined as the simple difference between estimated and observed option prices) on options on U.K. Gilts, German Bunds, and U.S. Treasury bond futures using models that include price jumps and stochastic volatility. This study finds that single and multi‐factor stochastic volatility models with jumps may explain the empirical regularities observed in bond futures. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:169–215, 2003     

Responsibility, Taint, and Ethical Distance in Business Ethics

Much light can be shed on events which characterize or underlie scandals at firms such as Enron, Arthur Andersen, Worldcom, ImClone, and Tyco by appealing to the notion of ethical distance. Various inquiries have highlighted the difficulties in finding or identifying particular individuals to blame for particular events, and in the context of situations as complex as these it can sometimes be helpful to investigate the comparative ethical distance of various participants in these events. In this essay I offer a characterization of ethical distance in terms of moral responsibility, and in doing so I describe and illustrate the rough inverse correlation between moral distance and degrees of moral responsibility. I urge that the concept of ethical distance is capable of shedding light upon situations in which several people are involved in bringing about a state of affairs. I then argue that moral responsibility cannot do justice to all situations involving ethical distance. When the distance between a person and a state of affairs grows sufficiently large, a different type of treatment is called for, and I introduce the notion of moral taint to describe the moral status of agents in these situations.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES: SOME EMPIRICAL MODELS

This paper proposes a model of audit fee determination based upon size and other characteristics of the auditee and the auditor, and upon whether there has been a recent change of auditor (which might lead to a low-balling effect). A novel feature of the model is that auditee size is measured in two dimensions, sales and assets, and is allowed to have a quadratic relationship with audit fee. The model was estimated for a sample of large listed UK companies for the years 1981 to 1988. The results support the low-balling hypothesis and also provide insights into the distinctive role of the Big 8 firms in the audit market.     

Analysing Perceived Downside Risk: the Component Value‐at‐Risk Framework

Multinational companies face increasing risks arising from external risk factors, e.g. exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices, which they have learned to hedge using derivatives. However, despite increasing disclosure requirements, a firm's net risk profile may not be transparent to shareholders. We develop the ‘Component Value‐at‐Risk (VaR)’ framework for companies to identify the multi‐dimensional downside risk profile as perceived by shareholders. This framework allows for decomposing downside risk into components that are attributable to each of the underlying risk factors. The firm can compare this perceived VaR, including its composition and dynamics, to an internal VaR based on net exposures as it is known to the company. Any differences may lead to surprises at times of earnings announcements and thus constitute a litigation threat to the firm. It may reduce this information asymmetry through targeted communication efforts.