Contractual Intermediaries

This article analyzes the role of third-party intermediariesin contract enforcement. In our model, intermediaries recordinformation about past actions and resolve disputes when requestedto do so by the contracting agents. When the verifiability ofinformation is limited, successful enforcement requires thatdispute resolution costs be sufficiently great. Optimal enforcementsystems economize on dispute resolution and information costs,and may involve establishment of specific systems tailored toparticular groups.     

THE CYCLICALITY OF SEPARATION AND JOB FINDING RATES*

This article uses CPS gross flow data to analyze the business cycle dynamics of separation and job finding rates and quantify their contributions to overall unemployment variability. Cyclical changes in the separation rate are negatively correlated with changes in productivity and move contemporaneously with them, whereas the job finding rate is positively correlated with and tends to lag productivity. Contemporaneous fluctuations in the separation rate explain between 40 and 50% of fluctuations in unemployment, depending on how the data are detrended. This figure becomes larger when dynamic interactions between the separation and job finding rates are considered.     

Measuring the extent of earnings discrimination: an update

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and data from the March 1990 Current Population Survey are used to estimate yearly earnings averages for white males, white females, black males and black females. In order to test for the possible existence or gender and/or race discrimination, earnings estimates are decomposed, using the tradional Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) methodology. In comparing these results with those from Carlson and Swartz (1988, using 1979 data), we find that overall and unexplained residual differences have declined quite substantially, but that they still favour white males. We then incorporate an extension of the traditional methodology (Jackson and Lindley, 1989) which allows for testing for the significance of enexplained residuals, and for jointly testing for the significance of residual effect components, the constant and coefficient effects. These results call into question the unambiguous conclusion that earnings differentials uniformly favour white males. Strong support is found for the Jackson–Lindley contention that significant and positive residuals may have have offsetting signs. More specifically, where males appear to receive an entry level premium, as measured by constant effect differentials, but other groups appear to receive favourable treatment as measured by response rates to changes in independent variables (the coefficient effect). This result suggests that efforts may be underway to ‘make up’ for the entry level white male premium.     

The effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade

Mindful of the market structure-conduct-performance paradigm fundamental to industrial organization research, this paper uses laboratory experimental techniques to study the impact of conspiratorial opportunities on market performance. We compare ‘posted-offer’ markets where sellers (but not buyers) are all conspiratorial opportunities with observations from three control groups: (1) posted-offer markets without conspiratorial opportunities, (2) ‘double-auction’ markets with conspiratorial opportunities and (3) posted-offer markets with true single-seller monopolists. The basic conclusions generated by our experimental design are: (1) seller conspiracies in posted-offer markets tend to raise prices (but not profits) relative to similarly organized markets without conspiracies, (2) posted-offer conspiracies tend to generate higher prices (but not profits) than double-auction conspiracies, and (3) posted-offer monopolies tend to generate higher profits (but not prices) then posted-offer conspiracies.