Construction of an economic index to measure the causes of economic insecurity

This paper is an updated study on the causes of economic insecurity in the United States. The authors have constructed an aggregate composite index that measures objectively the major causes of economic insecurity (CEI) in the United States. The CEI index consists of 11 variables that can cause economic insecurity. The time period under investigation is 1960 through 2001. A rising CEI index indicates that the causes of economic insecurity in the United States have increased in relative importance, which results in an increase in economic insecurity. Conversely, a falling CEI index indicates that the causes of economic insecurity have declined in relative importance, which results in a reduction of economic insecurity. However, despite substantial economic growth in the American economy from 1960 through 2001, the CEI index overall showed little improvement. The major conclusion is that the CEI index was 9 percent higher in 2001 than it was in 1960. This result was due largely to the increase in divorce, violent crime, rising out-of-pocket expenditures for health care, inflation, and unemployment. The results for subperiods are dramatically different, and we think more interesting, than the overall results. During the 1960s, there was a small decline in the CEI index. The 1970s showed a dramatic increase in the CEI index, which reflected both high unemployment rates and inflation rates during this period. The 1980s experienced fluctuating levels in the index but little overall change, and the 1990s experienced a sharp decline in the CEI index due largely to a robust economy. The CEI index has increased more recently, which reflects largely the recent 2001 business recession. The correlation coefficient of the CEI index with the University of Michigan's well-known Index of Consumer Sentiment is ?676. This figure shows that as the CEI index rises, consumer sentiment about the American economy becomes pessimistic and negative.     

Regulatory arbitrage and the FERC rate settlement process

We demonstrate that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) regulatory procedures for natural gas pipelines, specifically its rate-refund policy, induces regulatory arbitrage that leads to economic distortions. Specifically, we demonstrate that the rate refund policy causes pipelines effectively to “extort” ratepayers through the addition of economically inefficient capital investment, akin to “gold-plating” investments. We estimate the potential magnitude of this arbitrage impact on ratepayers to be between $400 and $700 million annually. Counterintuitively, however, we demonstrate that the presence of this arbitrage opportunity leads to underinvestment in pipeline capacity, thus negating one of the principal purposes of rate regulation. We further demonstrate that FERC could easily eliminate this regulatory arbitrage by setting the refund interest rate to the pipeline’s as-filed weighted average cost of capital.     

Competition and the relative productivity of large and small firms

Using a comprehensive dataset on the incidence of price-fixing across British manufacturing industries in the 1950s, I compare collusive and competitive industries and find evidence of a negative relationship between collusion and the labour productivity of larger firms relative to smaller firms. In particular, collusion is associated with a reduction or even a reversal of the productivity gap between larger and smaller firms. This result is robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion.     

Financial crisis and accounting quality: Evidence from five European countries

This study investigates how the economic crisis affects the scope for earnings manipulation and the value relevance of reported financial numbers for companies that are audited by a big 4 auditor. The analysis is focused on Portuguese, Irish, Italian, Greek and Spanish listed companies. The findings show that Portugal, Italy and Greece tend to engage more in earnings management in their effort to improve their lower profitability and liquidity, and accommodate their higher debt and growth. Ireland exhibits less evidence of earnings manipulation, while the findings for Spain are to some extent conflicting. Additionally, the reported financial numbers of Portuguese and Greek companies that are audited by a big 4 auditor were found to be of higher quality before the crisis. In contrast, Irish, Italian and Spanish companies report more value relevant financial numbers during the crisis. The results of this study are particularly useful for accounting regulators when preparing accounting rules that seek to reduce information asymmetry and earnings manipulation and increase the quality of reported disclosures in light of a crisis and for investors that need further assistance for the establishment of a profitable investment strategy in periods characterized by high uncertainty and volatility.