Efficiency of insurance firms with endogenous risk management and financial intermediation activities

Risk management is now present in many economic sectors. However, none of existing studies consider risk management as a potential determinant of firm performance. In this paper, we investigate the role of risk management and financial intermediation in creating value for financial institutions by analyzing U.S. property-liability insurers. Our main goal is to test how risk management and financial intermediation activities create value for insurers by enhancing economic efficiency through cost reductions. We consider these two activities as intermediate outputs and estimate their shadow prices. Insurer cost efficiency is measured using an econometric cost function. The econometric results show that both activities significantly increase the efficiency of the property-liability insurance industry.     

Centralized versus decentralized taxation of mobile polluting firms

We consider a world in which a mobile polluting firm must locate in one of two regions. The regions differ in two dimensions: their marginal cost of pollution and the production cost of the firm. It is shown that under incomplete information on regional marginal costs of pollution, fiscal competition may lead to the sub-optimal location of the firm. We also show that under incomplete information, a sub-optimal location is less likely under centralized than under decentralized taxation.     

Enterprise-state Relations after Mass Privatization: their Character in Mongolia

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -     

The volatile relationship between deficits and inflation in Ukraine, 1992-1996

This paper compares the annual average of inflation in Ukraine, from 1992 to 1996, with its steady-state tendency each year. The steady-state tendency is, in turn, computed from data on monetary velocity and on the proportion of the total public deficit financed by domestic monetary emissions. Velocity is that of the base of the inflation tax in the steady-state, namely household M2 plus a fraction of enterprise M2. The use of this concept rather than high-powered money corresponds to the public and quasi-public nature of most commercial banks and many large and medium-sized enterprises until 1996. The demonstrated rough correspondence between actual inflation and calculated, steady-state inflation confirms the validity of the underlying monetary model.     

Knowledge,action and public concern: the logic underlying mediators' actions in French labour conflicts

Since the early 1980s, a rich research literature on mediation has evolved. Mediation is becoming the norm for organizations facing individual or collective conflicts. The lack of empirical research confuses what mediators do and why they do it, confusion made even worse by a strong cultural dimension. Based on interviews with 54 French labour mediators, we have identified four logics of actions and the explaining variables. On the whole they appear as less than neutral. Their own ideology and time constraints are salient variables.     

Price formation on clandestine markets: the case of the Paris gold market during the Second World War

Because of the scarcity of data, there are few quantitative analyses dealing with clandestine markets, despite their prime importance during wartime. This article exploits a unique database of daily prices of gold coins traded in occupied Paris in order to gain insights into the price formation on such a market. First, using data from Switzerland, we show that arbitrage took place, despite the costs and risks involved, and led to a gradual (but incomplete) convergence of gold prices. Furthermore, a study of price seasonality reveals that less strict borders controls during the weekends made the volatility of returns higher at the start of the following week. Second, on the basis of an event study, we provide evidence that laws related to black markets did not have a significant impact on the gold price, except for the most severe law passed on 8 June 1943 which greatly increased the sentences for involvement. Finally, we assess whether the so‐called coin premiums existed on this clandestine market, and show that the large price variations for one gram of fine gold contained in different coins were due to market participants’ preferences for specific gold coins.     

The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge

We test the effects of the independence and financial knowledge of directors on risk management and firm value in the gold mining industry. Our original hand‐collected database on directors’ financial education, accounting background, and financial experience allows us to measure the effect of financial knowledge on risk management activities. We show that directors’ financial knowledge increases firm value through the risk management channel. This effect is strengthened by the independence of the directors on the board and on the audit committee. Extending the dimension of education, we show that, following unexpected shocks to gold prices, firms with financially educated directors are more effective in hedging than average firms in the industry. Firms that hedge more also attracts highly educated directors on their board and audit committee. As a policy implication, our results suggest adding the experience and education dimensions to the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act and New York Stock Exchange requirements for better governance.     

An indicator of early school leaving per school: every pupil counts

Quality & Quantity - Reducing early school leaving was an important objective of the Europe 2020 strategy of the European Union. One of its recommendations to the Member States was to set up...     

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

In this paper we develop a model that uses a dynamic framework to analyze the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, while all countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of total global emissions, non-signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing their own welfare, whereas signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. It is assumed that signatory countries will be able to punish non-signatories, at some cost to themselves. When countries decide on their pollution emissions, they account for the evolution of the stock of pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations characterized by partial cooperation within an IEA that is stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, and situations where no stable agreement is feasible. Where more than one possibility coexist, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e., the initial number of signatory countries and pollution level).