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991.
Dong‐Hyeon Kim Ho‐Chuan Huang Shu‐Chin Lin Chih‐Chuan Yeh 《Scottish journal of political economy》2010,57(4):493-514
This paper investigates whether the impacts of financial development on growth convergence vary with the stage of real development. We implement this analysis through the instrumental variable threshold regression approach proposed by Caner and Hansen. Our empirical evidence shows that financial intermediary development leads to long‐run convergence in growth of both economic activity and productivity. Moreover, such convergence‐enhancing effects of financial intermediation are stronger for less‐developed countries than for the more industrialized. In addition, the data reveal that stock market development assists growth convergence only in low‐income countries. 相似文献
992.
In standard political economy models, voters are “self‐interested” that is, care only about “own” utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have “other‐regarding preferences” (ORP), that is, in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit “envy” and “altruism,” in addition to the standard concern for “own utility.” We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences. 相似文献
993.
PHILIPPE MICHEL LEOPOLD VON THADDEN JEAN‐PIERRE VIDAL 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2010,12(5):923-941
Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be stabilized around a certain target level of debt by adjustments in various fiscal instruments, like government spending, transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of debt stabilizing rules which link the needed budgetary adjustments to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the magnitude of the target level of long‐run debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical target level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the target level of debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework that tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level. 相似文献
994.
Vicente Salas‐Fumás 《International Journal of the Economics of Business》2010,17(3):349-372
We model contracting for joint production between workers and shareholders when investment in knowledge is non‐verifiable and the resulting specific human capital embedded in the workers is non‐tradable. The model explains how the effective cost of human capital services will vary depending on whether the investment in knowledge is financed by the workers or by the shareholders. We apply the results of the modeling to identify which firms are expected to gain and which to lose from posted trends in higher employability and lower empowerment of workers in modern market economies. Finally, we present conditions on the self‐interest of current shareholders to empower workers as a way to stimulate their investment in firm‐specific human capital. 相似文献
995.
Using a contingency perspective and data from 122 CEOs of Spanish firms, this paper examines what makes a firm likely to adopt telecommuting. We hypothesized that employer adoption of telecommuting would depend on organizational constraints (age and size of the firm), the international composition of the workforce, and the top executives' leadership style. In turn, we argue that firms adopting telecommuting would emphasize outcome‐based control systems. Our empirical evidence showed that telecommuting correlated with small organizational size, a high proportion of international employees, and variable compensation. A contingent reward leadership style at the top moderated the effects of firm age and internationalization on the adoption of telecommuting. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 相似文献
996.
Overemphasis on financial performance criteria to award incentives for CEOs has often been mentioned as one of the main culprits behind recent corporate scandals. In response, there is a growing chorus for inclusion of social performance criteria in the design of executive compensation schemes. To date, however, very little is known about the true benefits of this practice. This article critically discusses the potential advantages and pitfalls of this recommendation. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 相似文献
997.
This article analyzes the relationship between profit‐sharing plans (PSP) and affective commitment and how it is affected by the context of the PSP application. Overall, there is a positive relationship between profit sharing and commitment that is strongest in very small firms. The efficacy of a PSP in improving employees' affective commitment appears to be greatest in firms with low job‐related employee participation. Its application in workplaces where employees enjoy high levels of participation appears to have little impact and may even result in slight declines in affective commitment. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 相似文献
998.
JOSÉ IGNACIO CONDE‐RUIZ VINCENZO GALASSO PAOLA PROFETA 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2013,15(3):477-505
We provide a long‐term perspective on the individual retirement behavior and on the future of retirement by emphasizing the role of (negative) income effects. We consider a political economic theoretical framework, with actuarially “fair” and “unfair” early retirement schemes, and derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. A reduction in the wages in youth, consistent with the recent labor market trends since the massive introduction of temporary jobs, induces workers to postpone retirement, and—in the “unfair” system—leads to lower contribution rates. A reduction in the growth rate of the economy has opposite effects on the retirement decisions, leading—in the “unfair” system—to more early retirement. Aging induces a negative income effect, but has also an opposite political effect on social security contributions and retirement decisions. For an actuarially “fair” social security system, we provide conditions for the political effect to dominate; in an “unfair” scheme, numerical simulations confirm a slight predominance of the political effect, as contribution rates increase. These results may shed some light on the future of early retirement in aging societies. 相似文献
999.
We show that an expansion in the government size could be desirable from the viewpoint of the economy's long‐run growth, wherein factor intensity between the sectors, the mode of public spending financing, and the form of the cash‐in‐advance (CIA) constraint are crucial. We also show that when real balances are required only for consumption purchases, money financing is equivalent to consumption tax financing, but is not equivalent to income tax financing. If both consumption and gross investment are liquidity‐constrained, then the three financing methods are mutually not equivalent. The optimal financing scheme has the following features: (1) when the CIA constraint applies only to consumption purchases, any combination of the money growth rate and the consumption tax rate that satisfies the government budget constraint constitutes an optimal financing mix; (2) when the CIA constraint applies to both consumption and investment purchases, consumption tax financing only is optimal. 相似文献
1000.
HSIU‐YUN LEE 《Contemporary economic policy》2013,31(2):407-423
The coexistence of secret intervention operations and “the signaling channel” (Mussa. The Role of Official Intervention, 1981) seems confusing. Vitale ( Journal of International Economics, 49, 1999, 245–267) resolves this puzzle by employing an asymmetric information framework and an assumption of a fundamental‐inconsistent target for the exchange rate. Ferré and Manzano ( International Journal of Finance and Economics, 14, 2009, 378–393) follow Vitale's microstructure framework and argue that the central banks' profitability motivation offers a rationale for their secret intervention even under a target consistent with the fundamentals. However, that the authority uses its superior information to obtain speculative profits through secret intervention in the market is not a typical goal for central banks. To theoretically explain the opaqueness in non‐profitmaking central banks' exchange rate policies, we employ a model of a central bank's optimization by considering that no bank really knows the exact fundamental rate and they take into account the possible bad consequences of announcing the intervention. We also show that, in passing the bank's private information to market participants, a bank's announcement of the intervention size is equivalent to revealing its target rate. (JEL E58, F39) 相似文献