Extreme interdependence and extreme contagion between emerging markets

This paper uses seemingly unrelated probit techniques to separate the transmission of a crisis due to broadly defined macroeconomic interdependence from contagion due to herding, avoiding some of the caveats of the more traditional cross-correlation approach. We find that pure contagion occurred in a limited number of country pairs generally belonging to the same region. A reduction in speculative pressure can also be identified between countries in different regional blocks. This seems to suggest that after an initial crisis episode, investors tend to discriminate on the basis of location and common macroeconomic weakness or perceived similarity.     

Some quasi-globally stable processes of price adjustment

In this paper, the existence of some quasi-globally stable processes of price adjustment in a perfectly competitive market, is proved. These processes are relative to a special class of “excess demand” vector fields satisfying regularity hypotheses and boundary conditions of classical type. Modifications of the above processes which, under different hypotheses, are still quasi-globally stable, are studied.     

Cost of Capital for Exempt Foreign Private Issuers: Information Risk Effect or Earnings Quality Effect? It Depends

We examine whether the information risk accompanying Foreign Private Issuers' (FPIs) exemptions from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting requirements is associated with capital market penalties (measured by a higher cost of equity capital) and, further, the extent to which this information risk is mitigated by earnings quality. Our overall results indicate that exempt FPIs exhibit a higher cost of equity capital than reporting FPIs, and this relation still persists after controlling for earnings quality. Furthermore, we partition our sample into firms from strong and weak investor protection environments. Interestingly, similar to the results in Francis et al. (2008), for FPIs from strong investor protection regimes we find no difference in the cost of capital between exempt and filing FPIs, even after controlling for earnings quality. To the contrary, for FPIs from weak investor protection regimes, we find that the exemption is associated with a higher cost of equity capital, and that earnings quality does not significantly reduce the premium paid by these issuers.     

Egalitarianism: An evolutionary perspective

Two parties bargain over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogenoeus. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Our main result is that egalitarianism is more likely to emerge in situations in which private property over the fruits of one's own independent investment is not secured.