SME financing and the choice of lending technology in Italy: Complementarity or substitutability?

This paper investigates SME financing in Italy. The literature distinguishes between two main different lending technologies (LTs) for SMEs: transactional and relationship LTs. We find that banks lend to SMEs by using both LTs together, independently of the size and proximity of borrowers. Moreover, we show that the use of soft information decreases the probability of firms being credit rationed. Finally, we find that more soft information is produced when the bank uses relationship LT as primary technology individually or coupled with transactional LT. Our results support the view that LTs can be complementary, but reject the hypothesis that substitutability among LTs is somehow possible for outsiders by means of hardening of soft information.     

Did the 2008–2009 Food and Financial Crises Affect Child Mortality? The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa

We estimate an aggregate model of child mortality on a panel of 40 African countries over the period 1995–2007. This model is then used to assess the impact of the 2008–2009 food and financial crises on child mortality, by comparing the number of child deaths computed under a “business-as-usual scenario” with those computed under the actual 2008–2009 “crisis scenario”. According to the simulation results, the 2008–2009 food price rise and recession caused a statistically non-significant additional 27,000 child deaths. However, if the 2008–2009 changes in other determinants of child mortality are factored in, the number of child deaths declined by 15,000. This unexpected result is explained by the fact that the effects of the rise in domestic food prices and the recession were offset in most of the region by the protective effect on the under-five mortality rate of a surge in food production, and by a rise in public expenditure on and foreign aid to the health sector.     

The effect of organizational culture on deviant behaviors in the workplace

Abstract

This study investigated the impact of organizational culture (OC) on deviant behaviors in the workplace (workplace deviant behaviors: WDB). We tested the hypothesis that different types of OC (according to the Competing Values Framework model) had an impact on WDB, in addition to the effect of Big Five personality traits. Survey research was undertaken with 954 employees of 30 enterprises in the public and private field, using a hierarchical model approach (HLM) to test the effects of four types of OC (Clan; Adhocracy; Market, Hierarchy) on WDB, over and above the effect of Five Personality traits. The HLM results partially supported our hypotheses, showing that the OC had a significant effect on WDB, with the adhocracy and clan cultures characterized by lower levels of WDB. Managerial implications about the importance of managing the OC are discussed.     

Cultural differences,insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision

We develop a theory of a multinational corporation’s optimal mode of entry in a new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising the incentives faced by the local partner. We are grateful to the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano for providing financial support. For useful comments we would like to thank Klaus Desmet, Cecilia Testa, Henry Wan and Gerald Willmann and seminar participants at Cornell, Ente Luigi Einaudi, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Kiel, Milano, Universidad de Sao Paolo, the Midwest International Economics Meetings in Indianapolis, SAET VI conference in Rhodes, and the City University of Hong Kong Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.     

Strategic Interactions and Contagion Effects under Monetary Unions

This paper applies game theory and a cost‐benefit analysis to study voluntary exits and contagion effects in countries joined to a monetary union. The paper looks at two non‐core or periphery countries of a large union and examines the role of structural asymmetries and strategic interactions as determinants of equilibrium outcomes, following both country‐specific and common shocks. The paper finds that under almost symmetry between countries, country‐specific shocks are never associated with multiple equilibria and, if large enough, can spread to other countries leading to contagion. By contrast, common shocks are seen to sustain multiple equilibria if almost‐symmetric countries are considered and to have implications similar to those found in the country‐specific case if large structural asymmetries are admitted.     

Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade‐offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice‐witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice‐witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.     

How risk influences the choice of governance mode in biopharmaceutical inter-firm relationships

This paper proposes a new theoretical framework for assessing the influence of risk in shaping the governance form in biopharmaceutical inter-firm relationships. In particular, we propose a multidimensional operationalization of relational and performance risk and, by following Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Real Options (RO) theory constructs, we hypothesize a relation between the aforementioned risk components and the choice of governance form. Specifically, following TCE reasoning, we hypothesize that a high level of relational risk leads towards more hierarchical governance forms, while, following RO theory, we hypothesize that a high level of performance risk leads toward market-oriented governance forms; finally, we hypothesize a moderating effect of each risk component on the other. We empirically test our framework through the analysis of 353 inter-firm relationships signed worldwide between pharmaceutical and biotech companies from 2007 to 2010. The results show substantive support for our theoretical framework. Furthermore, we find a significant moderating effect of the performance risk on the TCE relation between relational risk and governance forms.     

Market integration and market efficiency: The case of 19th century Italy

This paper examines market integration in Italy in the 19th century, focusing on wheat. Wheat prices converged well before political Unification (1859-1861) but the process halted during the 1860s only to resume in the 1870s and 1880s. The first wave of integration was caused mainly by improvements in market efficiency while the second wave owed much to a reduction in transport costs.     

Learning,market selection and the evolution of industrial structures

Industrial economics is a rich source of puzzles for economic theory. One of them — certainly the most discussed — regards the co-existence of firms (and plants) of different sizes, displaying rather invariant skewed distributions. Other puzzles, however, concern the sectoral specificities in industrial structures, the persistence of asymmetric corporate performances and the dynamics of entry and exit. The paper reports some preliminary results on evolutionary modeling of the links between the microeconomics of innovation, the patterns of industrial change and some observable invariances in industrial structures.First, the paper reviews a few of these empirical regularities in structures and in the patterns of change. Second, the paper discusses the achievements and limits of interpretations of the evidence based on equilibrium theories. Finally, it presents a model where these regularities are explained as emergent properties deriving from non equilibrium interactions among technologically heterogeneous firms. Moreover, simulation exercises show that also the intersectoral variety in the observed industrial structures and dynamics can be interpreted on the grounds of underlying specificities in the processes of technological learning — which is called technological regimes — and of the processes of market interactions — i.e. market regimes.This research has undertaken within an on going project sponsored by the Italian Research Council (CNR, Progetto strategico,Cambiamento tecnologico e sviluppo economico). Support by the Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation Centre for Research in Management, University of California at Berkeley is also gratefully acknowledged.