Ein empirischer Test der Annahme der permanenten Einkommenshypothese von Milton Friedman

Summary We apply the Variate-Difference-Method to yearly Austrian data from 1956 to 1975 to test the permanent-income-hypothesis byM. Fiedman.First we determe the degree of the polynomial, which is sufficient to eliminate the trend (i.e. the permanent part) from time series of disposable income. Then the permanent income variable is constructed in two alternative ways: first, as a polynomial in time and second bySheppard's smoothing formulae. Transitory consumption is identified with the residuals of the consumption function. A correlation analysis shows that, transitory income and consumption are correlated, if permanent income is determined by a trend polynomial, while this is not the case ifSheppard's smoothing formulae is used to estimate permanent income.Consumption functions are specified for total consumption, durables and non-durables and eleven sub-groups of total private consumption. The results indicate that autocorrelation can considerably be reduced by usingSheppard's smoothing formulae.     

Testing a model of intraurban firm relocation

A neoclassical model of firm behavior, analogous to Muth's household analysis, in a monocentric urban environment yields comparative static predictions concerning radial direction of relocation. Knowledge of plant production and demand conditions and economic characteristics of the urban environment is needed to make relocation predictions. Expected and unexpected relations between the technology, economic environment, and comparative static results on input demands and location are derived. A small, detailed data set from Cincinnati is used to test a probit model of the relocation decision. The results are consistent with theoretical expectations. Demand changes, initial plant size, and the relative magnitude of transport costs are the most important determinants of the propensity to decentralize. Traditional measures of agglomeration economies lack explanatory power.     

Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: Refining the co-evolutionary multi-level perspective

This article investigates transitions at the level of societal functions (e.g., transport, communication, housing). Societal functions are fulfilled by sociotechnical systems, which consist of a cluster of aligned elements, e.g., artifacts, knowledge, markets, regulation, cultural meaning, infrastructure, maintenance networks and supply networks. Transitions are conceptualised as system innovations, i.e., a change from one sociotechnical system to another. The article describes a co-evolutionary multi-level perspective to understand how system innovations come about through the interplay between technology and society. The article makes a new step as it further refines the multi-level perspective by distinguishing characteristic patterns: (a) two transition routes, (b) fit–stretch pattern, and (c) patterns in breakthrough.     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.     

The impact of the foreign corrupt practices act on us exports

In 1977 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted to penalize US firms and their employees for paying bribes to foreign government officials. If bribe payments influence the awarding of contracts and the FCPA regulation differentially affects US exporters compared to foreign competitors, then US exporters' bribe-paying ability and market share would be expected to decline. This study provides empirical evidence that the FCPA had a negative effect on US exports to non-Latin American countries but not to bribery prone ones in Latin America.     

A note on measuring political participation in comparative research

This article presents an application of Prezeworski and Teune's so-called “identity-equivalence method” to a large set of indicators of political participation. By relaxing commonly held assumptions about necessary distinctions among types of participation, it is found that the distinction between “conventional” and “unconventional” modes of participation is unnecessary, while the distinction between “government” and “nongovernment” has some merit. The findings also lend further support to the claims of Prezeworski and Teune that the identity-equivalence method is preferable to the identical indicator method.