Produktionslenkung und Preisbildung in der Marktform des Kollektivmonopols

Ohne ZusammenfassungMit 13 Abbildungen     

On the persistence of corruption

This paper tries to answer the question why the phenomenon of corruption seems to be inherently existent in any society. The dynamic model presented shows how rational agents may generate multiple equilibria of corruption within the same kind of socio-economic system. We assume that the individual disutility caused by the loss of reputation from a corrupt transaction depends on the acceptance of corrupt behavior by the representative individual. Depending on the values of some key parameters like the marginal utility of corrupt behavior and the initial acceptance of corruption a completely corrupt equilibrium where all people completely accept corruption or a completely honest equilibrium where corruption is not accepted at all may be the limit state of the optimal path. Also inner equilibria in-between exist; however, they are always unstable.     

Politico-economic cycles of regulation and deregulation

This paper considers politico-economic cycles that do not depend on the exogenous electoral cycles. More precisely, the paper develops a positive model of intertemporal subsidy strategies for an authoritarian and dynastic government. It will be shown — applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem — that cyclical strategies, i.e. waves of regulation, populism alternating with deregulation, cuts in social programmes, etc., may be optimal.     

Merger Policies and Trade Liberalisation

This paper is about the interactions between trade policy and a narrow but important aspect of competition policy, namely merger policy. We focus on links between merger policies and trade liberalisation. We put special emphasis on the topical issue of the role that international agreements such as the GATT play when merger policies are nationally chosen. Of particular concern is the possibility that liberalisation of international trade will induce countries to use competition policies to promote national interests at the expense of others.     

Über einN-elementiges Modell der Reiz-Stichproben-Theorie mit stetigem Zeitparameter und zwei Antwortklassen

Zusammenfassung Es wird ein Modell der Reiz-Stichproben-Theorie [vgl.Atkinson u.Estes] mit stetigem Zeitparameter untersucht. Dabei handelt es sich um ein sogenanntes Pattern-Modell mitN Reizelementen und zwei Antwortklassen. Die den Systemablauf beherrschenden Differentialgleichungen werden hergeleitet und gel?st. Es werden Resultate über das Grenzverhalten der verknüpften stochastischen Prozesse erzielt, insbesonders über den effektiven Antwortproze?. Ferner werden Methoden zur Punktsch?tzung der unbekannten ParameterN (Anzahl der Reizelemente) undc (Lernrate) behandelt.

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Summary A model of stimulus sampling theory [cp.Atkinson andEstes] with continuous time parameter is investigated. We are concerned with a so-called pattern model withN stimulus elements and two response classes. The differential equations governing the system are derived and solved. Some results on the limit behaviour of associated stochastic processes are obtained, concerning especially the actual response process. Furtheron methods are treated for point estimation of the unknown parametersN (number of stimulus elements) andc (learning rate).

     

Compromised imputation in survey sampling

In this paper, a compromised imputation procedure has been suggested. The estimator of mean obtained from compromised imputation remains better than the estimators obtained from ratio method of imputation and mean method of imputation. An idea to form “Warm Deck Method” of imputation has also been suggested. Received: July 1998     

On the optimality of limit cycles in dynamic economic systems

The purpose of this paper is to derive conditions for the optimality of a limit cycle in a dynamic economic system and to interpret them economically. A fairly general two-state continuous-time nonlinear optimal control problem is considered. It turns out that for this class of models three different economic mechanisms can be identified as the possible source of limit cycles. One relates to an intertemporal substitution effect expressed in terms of complementarity over time, the second one is a dominating cross effect between the state variables of the system (i.e., the capital stocks in our model), and the third one is positive growth at the equilibrium.We acknowledge the helpful comments by William A. Brock, Gerhard Sorger, Franz Wirl, and two anonymous referees. The research was partly supported by the Austrian Science Foundation under contract No. P6601.