Decomposing Redistributive Effects of Taxes and Transfers in Australia: Annual and Lifetime Measures

This paper decomposes the redistributive effect on annual and lifetime inquality of a range of taxes and transfers in Australia, using a dynamic cohort lifetime simulation model. The redistributive effect is decomposed into vertical, horizontal and reranking effects. Horizontal inequities in the tax and transfer system are found to be negligible. The extent of reranking is greater in the lifetime than in the annual context and is affected by the equivalence scales used to adjust household incomes. If no adjustment is made to household incomes, reranking is about nine per cent of the reduction in lifetime inequality. However, if each child is counted as equivalent to one-third of an adult, reranking is found to be less than one per cent.     

Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics

Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run. Correspondence to: J. Noailly     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Wage inflation and labour conflicts in the Netherlands : An empirical investigation using the co-integration approach

The ‘wage space’, which is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth, has played a major role as an indicator of allowable wage increases in the post-war wage negotiations in the Netherlands. This paper shows that: (a) wages and the wage space are co-integrated; (b) the deviation between wages and the wage space may act as an error correction term in the wage equation when both variables are identified as I(2); and (c) political consensus and the threat of labour conflicts (rather than actual strike activity) may be identified as the ‘mechanism’ behind this error correction in the wage equation.     

German rail vehicle construction in the context of market globalisation

Conclusion In the guise of ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation and Siemens, Germany has two powerful systems suppliers in a good position to keep pace with other systems suppliers on global markets. As in the air-travel industry it is conceivable that developments are moving towards a uniform rail technology. Although the buy national principle still dominates procurement practices, and national egos still dominate the development of rail systems (ICE, TGV), growing competition from Japan could force Europe to develop a European system. This would significantly increase the chances of European industry in bidding for international contracts. For this reason the EU should not relent in its efforts to standardise European rail systems.     

Consumer Bankruptcy: A Right or a Privilege? The Role of the Courts in Establishing Moral Standards of Economic Conduct

The Norwegian Consumer Bankruptcy Act was passed 17 July 1992 to give persons with "serious debt problems (. . .) the possibility to gain control over their economy." The Act contains provisions for negotiations between the debtor and the creditors, for court rulings on repayment plans, and for a discharge of the debts not covered by the plan. The origin of the Act was a social welfare approach to the problem of overindebtedness. However, the Act embodies an inherent contradiction in that it also includes moral elements in order to prevent it from exerting a negative influence on the perceived obligation to pay one's debts. This contradiction has given the courts a wide scope of discretion in the application of the Act. As a result, cases are treated differently in different jurisdictions. Some judges put more emphasis on moral evaluations than others. This situation also gives room for strategic action from creditor groups who typically are repeat players in cases of consumer bankruptcy. In this way the more objective, social welfare approach of the Act is undermined.