Analyzing a panel of seasonal time series: Does seasonality in industrial production converge across Europe?

In this paper we consider deterministic seasonal variation in quarterly industrial production for several European countries, and we address the question whether this variation has become more similar across countries over time. Due to economic and institutional factors, one may expect convergence across business cycles. When these have similar characteristics as seasonal cycles, one may perhaps also find convergence in seasonality. To this aim, we propose a method that is based on treating the set of production series as a panel. By testing for the relevant parameter restrictions for moving window samples, we examine the hypothesis of convergence in deterministic seasonality while allowing for seasonal unit roots. Our main empirical finding is that there is no evidence for convergence in seasonality.     

Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author.     

Environmental quality indicators: Background,principles and examples from Norway

The need for a simple and general overview of the development in the state of the environment has led to work on environmental indicators in several countries and international organizations. Except for the basic common requirement of providing an overview, the works vary a great deal with regard to final aim, target groups, classification and, hence, choice of indicators. This paper gives an overview of the work carried out in the Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway within this field, with emphasis on the basic principles behind the choice of indicators. A hierarchical system of indicator sets is proposed, and examples of indicators are presented. Also, a brief overview of work carried out elsewhere is included.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

German rail vehicle construction in the context of market globalisation

Conclusion In the guise of ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation and Siemens, Germany has two powerful systems suppliers in a good position to keep pace with other systems suppliers on global markets. As in the air-travel industry it is conceivable that developments are moving towards a uniform rail technology. Although the buy national principle still dominates procurement practices, and national egos still dominate the development of rail systems (ICE, TGV), growing competition from Japan could force Europe to develop a European system. This would significantly increase the chances of European industry in bidding for international contracts. For this reason the EU should not relent in its efforts to standardise European rail systems.     

Consumer Bankruptcy: A Right or a Privilege? The Role of the Courts in Establishing Moral Standards of Economic Conduct

The Norwegian Consumer Bankruptcy Act was passed 17 July 1992 to give persons with "serious debt problems (. . .) the possibility to gain control over their economy." The Act contains provisions for negotiations between the debtor and the creditors, for court rulings on repayment plans, and for a discharge of the debts not covered by the plan. The origin of the Act was a social welfare approach to the problem of overindebtedness. However, the Act embodies an inherent contradiction in that it also includes moral elements in order to prevent it from exerting a negative influence on the perceived obligation to pay one's debts. This contradiction has given the courts a wide scope of discretion in the application of the Act. As a result, cases are treated differently in different jurisdictions. Some judges put more emphasis on moral evaluations than others. This situation also gives room for strategic action from creditor groups who typically are repeat players in cases of consumer bankruptcy. In this way the more objective, social welfare approach of the Act is undermined.