Inter-market competition for exchange traded funds

We examine how the different mix of informed and liquidity trading in the market for ETFs affects the nature of inter-market competition. We find that both the characteristics of the securities and the structures of the competing markets jointly determine the nature of inter-market competition. Given the superior execution quality on the ECNs and the low adverse selection costs in the ETF market, anonymous market such as the ECNs, attract both liquidity and informed traders. We also find that markets compete in a subset of ETFs. In addition, we find that quotebased competition is prevalent in the market for ETFs.     

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election. In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium. We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington, Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson, Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged.     

On the Use of Value Efficiency Analysis and Some Further Developments

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the use of Value Efficiency Analysis (VEA) in efficiency evaluation when preference information is taken into account. Value efficiency analysis is an approach, which applies the ideas developed for Multiple Objective Linear Programming (MOLP) to Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Preference information is given through the desirable structure of input- and output-values. The same values can be used for all units under evaluation or the values can be specific for each unit. A decision-maker can specify the input- and output-values subjectively without any support or (s)he can use a multiple criteria support system to assist him/her to find those values on the efficient frontier. The underlying assumption is that the most preferred values maximize the decision-maker's implicitly known value function in a production possibility set or a subset. The purpose of value efficiency analysis is to estimate a need to increase outputs and/or decrease inputs for reaching the indifference contour of the value function at the optimum. In this paper, we briefly review the main ideas in value efficiency analysis and discuss practical aspects related to the use of value efficiency analysis. We also consider some extensions.     

Managerial bonding and stock liquidity: An analysis of dual-class firms

Given the decision to create a second class of stock through a dual-class structure, we propose that management is more (less) likely to create a liquid secondary market for both classes of shares the lower (higher) its willingness to tie its personal wealth to firm performance. If market makers recognize this relation, they should assign a higher likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of firms that list both classes of stock and a lower likelihood for firms that list only one class of stock pursuant to recapitalization. Additionally, they should assign a lower likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of IPOs that choose a dual-class structure and list only one class relative to IPOs that remain single-class. Our empirical tests based on IPOS and recaps between 1985 and 1988 provide support for these propositions.     

Ownership structure and golden parachutes: Evidence of credible commitment or incentive alignment?

Using a sample of S & P 500 firms, we find that golden parachutes are associated with concentrated external ownership, less concentrated internal ownership, and non-Delaware incorporation. We find little support that concentrated external owners use golden parachutes as credible commitment devices. The general multivariate results support the incentive alignment hypothesis, and reaffirm the view that golden parachutes are a mechanism used to align managerial and shareholder interests when there is a separation between ownership and control. (JEL G32)     

Abschätzung der Varianz stetiger Merkmale aus Intervallbreite und Mittelwert

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Optimale Schichtabgrenzung bei logarithmischer Normalverteilung

Zusammenfassung Optimale Schichtgrenzen werden under der Voraussetzung ermittelt, da? das Schichtungsmerkmal einer logarithmischen Normalverteilung folgt und gleich dem Untersuchungsmerkmal ist.