我与《走向世界》的缘分

2001年美好的秋日时节,正是我在中国教授英语第一个学期的时候.当时,我在中国伟大的书法家王羲之的故乡临沂市的双月园学校工作.很幸运的是,通过别人的介绍,我认识了<走向世界>杂志的副总编(现总编)纪涛先生.纪涛先生很喜欢我拍摄的照片,于是,要我给<走向世界>写些东西.此后,我撰写的<中国人的笑脸>一文很快在<走向世界>2002年第1期上刊登了.……     

Reviews

YUGOSLAVIA IN TURMOIL.

Simmie, J. and Dekleva, J. 1991: Yugoslavia in Turmoil: after self-management?, London: Pinter Publishers, £35.00 cloth.

THE DEFENCE OF WELFARE.

Whitfield, D. 1992: The Welfare State. London: Pluto, £45.00 cloth, £19.95 paper.

GLOBAL FINANCE.

Budd, L. and Whimster, S. (eds) 1992: Global Finance and Urban Living, London: Routledge, £40.00 hardback, £13.99 paperback.

LABOUR MARKET RESEARCH.

Moore, B. and Townroe, P. 1990: Urban Labour markets - Reviews of Urban Research, Department of the Environment: HMSO, £11.25.     

Institutionalization of Tipping as a Source of Managerial Control

This paper explores, investigates and analyses the rationale, approach and outcomes of the attempts by management to control the behaviour of front–line service workers through the institutionalization of customer tipping. It presents evidence generated from an in–depth case study of a highly successful UK restaurant group to suggest that the management of tipping is a way of controlling the behaviour of front–line service workers. However, rather than view such control as purely exploitative and one–sided, it is argued that there is a degree of 'mutual instrumentality', in that the findings suggest that workers voluntarily and consciously submit to subjugation for purely instrumental benefits.     

Derivation of regional shadow prices

[Hurter and Moses, 1964] presented a solvable model combining input-output analysis and linear programming to derive regional product ’shadow’ prices. Their measure of prices is incomplete since it includes only regional variation-in transport and resource costs and not the intermediate product costs. The reason for this exclusion is obvious: product prices are needed to obtain intermediate product costs. In this note we extend the Hurter-Moses model to derive a full measure of regional shadow prices.     

Computing optimal tax equilibria

This paper proposes a technique for computing optimal taxes in a full general equilibrium model. It is based upon a fixed point algorithm of the type that is widely used to solve Walrasian general equilibrium models. Computing an optimal tax equilibrium is more difficult than solving a general equilibrium model only to the extent that the derivatives of the social welfare function and of the consumer demand functions must be calculated in the former case. Solutions to several sample problems are provided to demonstrate the technique. They suggest that optimal tax rates are exceedingly sensitive to the specification of the model used to derive them.