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91.
Multinational companies (MNCs) frequently adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities that are aimed at providing ‘public goods’ and influencing the government in policymaking. Such political CSR (PCSR) activities have been determined to increase MNCs’ socio-political legitimacy and to be useful in building relationships with the state and other key external stakeholders. Although research on MNCs’ PCSR within the context of emerging economies is gaining momentum, only a limited number of studies have examined the firm-level variables that affect the extent to which MNCs’ subsidiaries in emerging economies pursue PCSR. Using insights from resource dependence theory, institutional theory, and the social capital literature, we argue that MNCs’ subsidiaries that are critically dependent on local resources, have greater ties to managers of related businesses and to policymakers, and that those that are interdependent on the MNCs’ headquarters and other foreign subsidiaries, are more likely to be involved in PCSR. We obtain support for our hypotheses using a sample of 105 subsidiaries of foreign firms that operate in India. Our findings enhance our understanding of the factors that determine MNCs’ political CSR in emerging economies.  相似文献   
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Based on principal agent theory we posit that managers account for a business combination opportunistically by recognizing goodwill in excess of its economic determinants. We examine the relationship between CEOs’ short-term cash bonuses and the amount of goodwill recognized in IFRS acquisitions. We find that with increasing cash bonus intensity managers recognize more goodwill. More detailed analysis indicates that this relationship is not a linear one. Instead, there seems to be a corridor in which CEOs are susceptible to the incentive given by bonus payments. In particular, the relationship seems to be fulfilled only for CEOs whose cash bonus is between 150% and 200% of their base salary prior to the acquisition. Our findings have an implication for companies that bonus caps should be introduced to limit CEOs’ bonuses to a given percentage of their base salary. By doing so, they may re-align shareholders’ and managers’ interests and avoid an increased impairment risk in the future.  相似文献   
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Governments in Australia are purchasing water entitlements to secure water for environmental benefit, but entitlements generate an allocation profile that does not correspond fully to environmental flow requirements. Therefore, how environmental managers will operate to deliver small and medium‐sized inundation environmental flows remains uncertain. To assist environmental managers with the supply of inundation flows at variable times, it has been suggested that allocation trade be incorporated into efforts aimed at securing water. This paper provides some qualitative and quantitative perspective on what influences southern Murray–Darling Basin irrigators to trade allocation water at specific times across and within seasons using a market transaction framework. The results suggest that while irrigators now have access to greater risk‐management options, environmental managers should consider the possible impact of institutional change before intervening in traditional market activity. The findings may help improve the design of intervention strategies to minimise possible market intervention impacts and strategic behaviour.  相似文献   
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Coordination in collective wage setting can constrain potential monopoly gains to unions in non-tradable industries. Countries with national wage coordination can thus stabilize overall employment against fluctuations and shocks in the world economy. We investigate this argument by exploring within-country variation in exposure to competition from China in 13 European countries. Our estimates demonstrate that in countries with uncoordinated wage setting, regions with higher import exposure experienced a marked fall in employment, while countries with wage coordination experienced no such employment effects. We show that our findings are robust to alternative measures of wage coordination, industry classifications, and trade exposure.  相似文献   
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