Verbesserung des nicht-randomisierten exakten Testes von R.A. Fisher

Summary The so-called Exact Test of R. A. Fisher for comparing two probabilitiesp ₁ andp ₂ in a Fourfold-Table with small cell frequencies is known as a UMPU-Test. But in practice the test is used in a nonrandomized, often tabulated version. Given a certain level of significanceα it is shown: the critical region of this nonrandomized test, referred to as “Fisher 1”, can be enlarged considerably. For instance for all sample-size-sums up to 20 andα=0.01 the total number of points in the critical regions of “Fisher 1” is 552 whereas the analogous number of the new version “Fisher 2” is 788. The size of tables for “Fisher 2” can be reduced considerably because the main parts of the critical regions can be described by the aid of some Chi-square-test versions. In particular Yates’ continuity-correction turns out to be always conservative in the above mentioned region relative to “Fisher 2” whereas this is not strictly true relative to “Fisher 1”.      

Controversial strategies for the regional advancement of developing countries

The following article outlines the theories of development strategy which approach the subject from the theory of growth and discusses their practical applicability to planning activities in developing countries.     

Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property

A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78.     

The local best response criterion: An epistemic approach to equilibrium refinement

The standard refinement criteria for extensive form games, including subgame perfect, perfect, perfect Bayesian, sequential, and proper, reject important classes of reasonable Nash equilibria and accept many unreasonable Nash equilibria. This paper develops a new refinement criterion, based on epistemic game theory, that captures the concept of a Nash equilibrium that is plausible when players are rational. I call this the local best response (LBR) criterion. This criterion is conceptually simpler than the standard refinement criteria because it does not depend on out-of-equilibrium, counterfactual, or passage to the limit arguments. The LBR is also informationally richer because it clarifies the epistemic conditions that render a Nash equilibrium reasonable. The LBR criterion appears to render the traditional refinement criteria superfluous.     

European policies and regulation

This article describes the three main objectives of the European Community's programme of regulatory reform in the telecommunication sector: liberalization, the separation of regulatory and operational functions, and the realization of scale economies. Particular attention is paid to the new Directive on Open Network Provision.