Credit policy,real exchange rate volatility and moral hazard

We extend the well-developed theoretical literature on unconventional credit policy from a closed economy to a small open economy. Consistent with the literature, we find that credit policy has positive effects on output and consumption by raising investment demand. In terms of expanding output, it is more effective to extend government credit to banks than to the goods-producing sector because for each unit of credit supplied to banks, banks - through leverage - can supply greater than one unit of intermediation to firms. We find the welfare implications are ambiguous and depend on the type of policy chosen. A policy of providing funds to goods-producing firms tends to be welfare-improving because it dampens the responses of all variables after a negative shock, including the real exchange rate. However, providing government assistance to the banking sector may be a costly policy because it encourages greater risk-taking on part of banks, leading to higher bank leverage. All else equal, this increases the volatility of the economy, raising the variances of consumption and of the real exchange rate, which is welfare-deteriorating. We interpret this as indicative of the problem of moral hazard associated with a policy of providing support to failing banks.     

A comparison of the appraisal process for auction and private treaty residential sales

This paper examines residential sale mechanisms from an appraisal perspective and empirically tests for differences in the valuation process for auctioned and private treaty sales. We test the hypothesis that agents use different criteria in preparing the guide prices for auctioned housing, with an element of under pricing in order to aid in the marketing of the property. The empirical tests are undertaken on a sample of auctioned and private treaty sales in Dublin, Ireland for the period of 1997–2004. We find that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that agents do adjust valuations for auctions to attract additional potential bidders.     

When Do State-Owned Firms Crowd Out Private Investment?

This paper examines the conditions under which a state-owned firm with a political agenda strategically crowds out investment by a private firm. Employing reduced-form analysis, we show that strategic crowding out occurs if (i) the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes, and (ii) private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm’s perspective. We discuss how our analysis applies to real-world markets and argue that it provides an explanation for the ambivalent evidence on the effect of public on private investment: State ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for crowding out to occur.     

European Parliament elections in times of crisis

In May 2014, EU citizens will vote in the most important European Parliament elections to date. With the new powers allocated to it by the Lisbon Treaty, the new European Parliament will shape EU policies in many important areas and will elect the President of the Commission. However, public confi dence in the EU has fallen to historically low levels — to a great extent due to the fi nancial crisis and its aftermath — and the participation rate in European Parliament elections has dropped steadily since the fi rst call for a direct vote in 1979. This raises fundamental questions about its political and democratic legitimacy. This Forum examines the economic agendas of the main political parties vying for power and the potential outcome of the May elections, including the role that radical and anti-euro parties are likely to play in the campaign and in the next Parliament.     

Optimal vessel size and output in the Australian northern prawn fishery: a restricted profit function approach*

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are to be introduced into Australia’s Northern Prawn fishery in the near future. Total allowable catches (TACs) are to be set with the objective of maximising economic efficiency in the fishery. Under ITQs, vessel owners have the ability to adjust their fishing activities to maximise profits and changes in fleet structure resulting from management changes need to be considered when determining TACs. A restricted profit function for the fishery was estimated to determine the optimal vessel characteristics and output levels as a guide to how the fleet may adjust under an ITQ system. Vessels were found to be currently close to their optimal size given average historic prices and current stock conditions. However, higher tiger prawn stocks are expected to result in the average size of vessels increasing, with rising fuel prices also likely to result in capital being substituted for fishing days. Optimal average vessel‐level catches of the main species are lower than current average vessel catches for a wide range of input and output prices. These changes in vessel characteristics and behaviour need to be incorporated in the derivation of the optimal TACs if economic efficiency objectives are to be achieved.     

Is Dual Agency in Real Estate a Cause for Concern?

We examine the effects of the regulation of dual agency in residential real estate transactions, for 10,888 transactions in Long Island, New York in 2004–2007. We find that dual agency has an overall null effect on sale price, but includes two opposing forces where buyer and seller interests might be compromised. The link between dual agency and timing of sales is less clear. These findings are robust to endogeneity bias. Although it appears dual agency does cause some market distortions, our analysis yields little evidence that prohibiting dual agency in real estate will increase welfare.     

Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration

We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete in quantities downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure effects, and vertical integration even to full foreclosure can be procompetitive. Interestingly, vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is otherwise more concentrated. Extensions analyze welfare effects of integration and the incentives to integrate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should be wary of vertical integration when the integrating firm faces many competitors and should be permissive otherwise.     

Information sharing and group efficacy influences on communication and decision quality

Group efficacy has generally been found to have a positive effect on group performance. This study reveals a less favorable consequence of high group efficacy, its tendency to promote inferior group decisions under certain circumstances. Previous studies have found that members in a group generally exhibit bias towards utilizing shared information to make decisions. This study examines the effect of group efficacy on both the process (in terms of communication) and outcomes (in terms of decision quality and deviation from initial individual preference) of group decision-making. When information was not completely shared by group members prior to group discussion, members of low-efficacy groups communicated more and more readily changed their initial decision preferences. In the end, they were able to make objectively better decisions. These effects of group efficacy were even more pronounced when individual group members had conflicting information in the beginning about the issues prior to group discussion.