Europe '92. Decentralizing environmental policy in the single market

The creation of the EC's internal market by the end of 1992 appears to necessitate a harmonization of environmental policies in the European Community. Against this background, the paper analyzes the options for decentralizing environmental policy in Europe and indicates some limitations of this approach.It is shown that, in the case of stationary sources, a harmonization is not required whereas, in the case of international spillovers and global environmental systems, a decentralization of policies is possible if countries can agree on international diffusion norms or national emission quantities, respectively. A harmonization seems to be unavoidable if product norms have to be applied, e.g. in the case of pollutants in consumption goods. Generally, however, price instruments should be used wherever possible, since they allow for a regional differentiation of environmental qualities without segmenting European markets.     

Manufacturers and retailers in the global economy

We develop a model with multi‐product retailers acting as intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. We show that the rise in retailer product assortment, the rise of up‐front payments in many retail markets and the observed shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing may be the consequence of the global integration of product markets. We also identify a novel benefit from market integration consisting of efficiency gains in the vertical distribution chain.     

BookReview

We compare the bias in binomial trees against that in certain analytical/numerical valuation techniques with which they disagree. We consider the CRR tree, the COS method and the Leisen–Reimer as well as the Prekopa–Szantai exponentially smoothed method. We conclude that the binomial trees are unbiased and that the exponentially smoothed method is biased.     

Competition Tests with a Non-Structural Model: the Panzar–Rosse Method Applied to Germany's Savings Banks

Abstract. In this paper we adopt the Panzar–Rosse approach to assess the competitive conditions in the German banking market for the period from 1993 to 2002. We suggest several improvements to the empirical application of the approach and show that frequently used empirical models that apply price rather than revenue functions lead to biased results. Using disaggregated annual data from more than 400 savings banks (Sparkassen) the empirical findings indicate monopolistic competition, the cases of monopoly and perfect competition are strongly rejected. Furthermore, small banks seem to enjoy even more market power than larger institutions.