Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism

We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of competitive outcomes in a pure-exchange economy with finitely many households. We construct a feasible price-quantity mechanism, which fully implements Walras equilibria via Nash equilibria in fairly general environments. Traders’ preferences need neither to be ordered nor continuous. In addition, the mechanism is such that no pure strategy is weakly dominated, hence is bounded (in the sense of Jackson 1992). In particular it makes no use of any integer game.     

Cultural differences in organizational citizenship behavior: a comparison between Chinese and American employees

The present study examined the differences in the perceptions of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) between Chinese and American employees. Survey responses concerning the presence of OCB in their organizations were collected from a total of 393 employees. Analyses showed that Chinese and American employees reported similar levels of personal support and conscientious initiative in their organizations, but Chinese employees reported higher levels of organizational support in comparison with American employees. In addition, results indicated that perceptions of personal support, organizational support, and conscientious initiative were a function of job/hierarchical level such that management reported lower levels on all three dimensions of OCB. Finally, the results showed that country and job/hierarchical level do not interact to influence perceptions of organizational citizenship behavior. Implications and directions for future research on cultural differences in organizational citizenship behavior are discussed.     

Data snooping in equity premium prediction

We analyze the performance of a comprehensive set of equity premium forecasting strategies. All strategies were found to outperform the mean in previous academic publications. However, using a multiple testing framework to account for data snooping, our findings support Welch and Goyal (2008) in that almost all equity premium forecasts fail to beat the mean out-of-sample. Only few forecasting strategies that are based on Ferreira and Santa-Clara’s (2011) sum-of-the-parts approach generate robust and statistically significant economic gains relative to the historical mean even after controlling for data snooping and accounting for transaction costs.     

The effect of online scheduling on employees’ quality of life

Online employee scheduling has increased in popularity in recent years, especially among hourly workers who have grown up in the information age and the flexibility it provides increases their sense of job autonomy. This article reports on two studies that investigated the impact of work scheduling flexibility on employees’ personal well-being. One study collected data from current users of an online scheduling product and the other study collected information from hospitality management students who are potential future users of online scheduling software. The studies found that online scheduling helps to enhance employees’ personal well-being through satisfaction with schedule flexibility and job autonomy.     

Unravelling agency relations inside the MNC: The roles of socialization,goal conflicts and second principals in headquarters-subsidiary relationships

Prior research has advanced classical agency theory to account for various characteristics of headquarters (HQ)-subsidiary relations in the multinational corporation (MNC). In an attempt to contribute to this line of research, in this paper, we propose and test an agency model for HQ-subsidiary relations inside the MNC. Drawing on classical agency assumptions, we develop a baseline hypothesis that links informal controls (i.e., socialization), HQ-subsidiary goal conflicts, and the HQ’s use of formal controls (i.e., behavioral controls). We subsequently introduce an important boundary condition, which reflects subsidiaries’ internal agency relations with subsidiary CEOs as second principals. More specifically, we argue that the baseline relationship only holds under low levels of second principal power. To test our model, we employed a unique study design with three parallel surveys addressing the agents and the two principals involved in 131 agency relations within one MNC.