Risk and the cross section of stock returns

This paper mathematically transforms unobservable rational expectation equilibrium model parameters (information precision and supply uncertainty) into a single variable that is correlated with expected returns and that can be estimated with recently observed data. Our variable can be used to explain the cross section of returns in theoretical, numerical, and empirical analyses. Using Center for Research in Security Prices data, we show that a −1σ$-1\sigma$ to +1σ$+1\sigma$ change in our variable is associated with a 0.31% difference in average returns the following month (equaling 3.78% per annum). The results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results remain economically and statistically significant after controlling for stocks' market capitalizations, book-to-market ratios, liquidities, and the probabilities of information-based trading.     

Institutional ownership,analyst following,and share prices

We study the mutual relationships between institutional ownership, analyst following and share prices. We show that the pressure on firms to set lower share prices to attract analysts is attenuated by institutional monitoring. Our theory refutes the assumed causal relation between share price and institutional ownership, attributed to the share price–liquidity relation, and we show empirically that share prices and institutional ownership are positively related after controlling for liquidity. Our study provides a rationale for why better firms generally maintain higher share price levels, and offers new insights into the puzzling empirical linkages observed between nominal share price levels and firm fundamentals.     

How Sensitive Are Bank Managers to Shareholder Value?

We test for the existence of market discipline by shareholders of banks with a wide range of ownership structures. Discipline by shareholders manifests itself through monitoring banks’ level of risk as well as through influencing banks’ management actions. We find that shareholders utilize the relation between stock returns and different types of risk measures to monitor risky banks. Shareholders partially influence bank management by responding to decreasing stock returns with a demand to improve loan quality. Moreover, the influence on management in small banks is more pronounced compared to large banks.     

Earnings Volatility,Post–Earnings Announcement Drift,and Trading Frictions

We find that lower ex ante earnings volatility leads to higher Post–Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise and its persistence. While prior research has largely investigated market reactions to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, in this study we show that the persistence of the earnings surprise is equally important. A unique feature of the anomalous PEAD returns documented here concerns the association between abnormal returns and trading frictions. Besides demonstrating that firms with lower earnings volatility have higher abnormal returns, we also find that lower earnings volatility firms have lower trading frictions. Taken together, these findings imply that higher abnormal returns are associated with lower trading frictions. We exploit this implication to empirically demonstrate that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are not concentrated in the firms with the largest trading frictions, which is in contrast to the findings in prior anomaly studies.     

Investor Information Demand: Evidence from Google Searches Around Earnings Announcements

The objective of this study is to investigate factors that influence investor information demand around earnings announcements and to provide insights into how variation in information demand impacts the capital market response to earnings. The Internet is one channel through which public information is disseminated to investors and we propose that one way that investors express their demand for public information is via Google searches. We find that abnormal Google search increases about two weeks prior to the earnings announcement, spikes markedly at the announcement, and continues at high levels for a period after the announcement. This finding suggests that information diffusion is not instantaneous with the release of the earnings information, but rather is spread over a period surrounding the announcement. We also find that information demand is positively associated with media attention and news, and is negatively associated with investor distraction. When investors search for more information in the days just prior to the announcement, preannouncement price and volume changes reflect more of the upcoming earnings news and there is less of a price and volume response when the news is announced. This result suggests that, when investors demand more information about a firm, the information content of the earnings announcement is partially preempted.     

The Value of Investment Banking Relationships: Evidence from the Collapse of Lehman Brothers

We examine the long‐standing question of whether firms derive value from investment bank relationships by studying how the Lehman collapse affected industrial firms that received underwriting, advisory, analyst, and market‐making services from Lehman. Equity underwriting clients experienced an abnormal return of around ?5%, on average, in the 7 days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy, amounting to $23 billion in aggregate risk‐adjusted losses. Losses were especially severe for companies that had stronger and broader security underwriting relationships with Lehman or were smaller, younger, and more financially constrained. Other client groups were not adversely affected.     

The time‐varying performance of UK analyst recommendation revisions: Do market conditions matter?

This study examines the time‐varying performance of investment strategies following analyst recommendation revisions in the UK stock market, with specific emphasis on the impact of changing market conditions. We find a negative relationship between the recommendation performance and market conditions as measured in terms of past market return and market volatility. In particular, the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio generates significantly positive (negative) net abnormal returns in bad market conditions (e.g., the dot‐com bubble burst in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007), but not in other periods of time. Moreover, our non‐temporal threshold regression analysis shows that the reported negative relationship disappears when market conditions become better, i.e., when the past market return (market volatility) is higher (lower) than a certain level, indicating the importance of taking non‐linearity into account in the long sample period as examined in this study. Our time‐series bootstrap simulations further confirm that the superior recommendation performance in bad market conditions is not due to random chance; analysts have certain skills in making valuable up/downward revisions in bad markets.     

The effect of relative performance feedback on individual performance in team settings under group-based incentives*

This study reports the results of an experiment that analyses the behavioural effect of relative performance feedback (RPF) on individual performance when compensation is based on team performance. Specifically, it investigates whether RPF affects individual performance differently when the comparison focuses on other members of that individual’s team (within-group RPF) or on other teams (between-group RPF). We predict a negative effect of within-group RPF on individual performance. We also predict that between-group RPF moderates that negative effect, since it encourages individuals to focus on group goals rather than individual goals. Consistent with our predictions, results show that the negative effect of within-group RPF on individual performance is mitigated by between-group RPF. Our results can help accountants to better understand how the effects of relative performance feedback differ according to the predominant comparison target.     

Empirical bias in intraday volatility measures

Intraday volatility measures have recently become the norm in risk measurement and forecasting. This article empirically investigates the unbiasedness of three of these measures over four different datasets. We find that the three measures are significantly biased and that the bias can have either sign.