ABSTRACTEquityholders of firms with high debt loads have an incentive to underinvest, a distortion that can be most costly for firms with attractive growth options. Using a novel patent-based measure of a firm's growth options, we find that firms issue more equity and shy away from debt financing when they have larger investment opportunities sets. The results are more pronounced among firms in patent-intensive industries. The findings suggest the existence of conflicts of interest between debtholders and equityholders. Our results are consistent with the use of conservative debt policies by technology-intensive firms to mitigate the debt overhang associated with their future growth options. 相似文献
Recent research has provided important insights on consumers’ preferences for prepayment mechanisms and on its impact on consumption of a given product or service. However, little is known about how prepayment influences future purchases of goods and services. We consider this question in a contractual setting within the services industry, involving different purchasing decisions over time. Based on a large-scale empirical test, we find that prepay customers make fewer changes to their cross-buying levels (i.e., the number of different services they buy from the company) from one contractual period to another, and that this effect is more salient for the firm's new customers. We propose possible explanatory mechanisms for this effect. For instance, based on mental budgeting theory, we suggest that prepayment customers may set mental budgets and track expenditures against this budget leading them to resist further investments. Alternatively, prepayment customers may be more certain about their consumption behavior leading to fewer changes over time.
This study examines the effect of downstream firms’ (i.e., customers’) risk factor disclosures contained in annual reports on the investment efficiency of upstream firms (i.e., suppliers). We find that more informative disclosures of customers’ risk factors are associated with less under‐ or overinvestment by suppliers. In addition, this inverse association is stronger when the suppliers are at a bargaining disadvantage, when they operate in the durable goods industries, and when they are more concerned about the volatility of future demand. Overall, our results suggest that risk factor disclosures provided by firms in their annual reports contain useful information that could potentially help their suppliers achieve better investment efficiency. Divulgation d'information sur les facteurs de risque des clients et efficience de l'investissement des fournisseurs 相似文献
We analyze voting behavior in a large electorate in which voters have adversarial state-contingent preferences with incomplete information about the state of the world. We show that one type of voter can suffer from the swing voter's curse à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer [The swing voter's curse, Amer. Econ. Rev. 86 (1996) 408-424], and go on to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of this model under different parameter values. We prove that unlike settings with nonadversarial preferences, there are equilibria in which in one state of the world, a minority-preferred candidate almost surely wins the election and thus the election may fail to correctly aggregate information. Indeed, we show that the fraction of the electorate dissatisfied with the result can be as large as . 相似文献
This paper provides a theory and evidence that the risk premium puzzle is viewed as a phenomenon pertaining to the unstable
foreign exchange market. In an unstable market, revision error uncompensated by an initial risk premium accrues due to consumer
expectation revision about the ex ante uncertainty of the exchange rate. The risk premium widely deviates from its initial level, depending on the frequency of
the consumer expectation revision and the degree of risk aversion. Subsequent evidence shows the existence of the revision
errors for the risk premium during the Asian currency crisis and the recent financial crisis periods. 相似文献
Allowing for multiple structural breaks and cross-section dependence, we re-investigate the hypothesis that the catch-up rates stochastically converge for 13 Asian countries from 1960 to 2007. Non-rejection of stationarity provides evidence for stochastic convergence, implying that following shocks to the catch-up rate, it will eventually revert to its long-run level. 相似文献
The objective of this research was to determine whether willingness to bear the negative externality from water quality impairment differs between those who do and those who do not receive economic benefit from the impairment source. Differences were tested using a hedonic analysis of ambient water quality in two discrete housing markets in the Pigeon River Watershed, which have been polluted by the operation of a paper mill. The results suggest that North Carolina residents residing in subwatersheds with impaired portions of the Pigeon River, who experience economic benefit from the paper mill in addition to its harmful effects on water quality, do perceive the pollution as a negative externality. In contrast, the effects of both the degraded river and its contributing streams on property values are perceived as negative externalities by watershed residents in Tennessee who experience only harmful effects from the pollution. Differences in willingness to bear the water-impairment externality were not indicated by variables representing view of and proximity to impaired water bodies. The results suggest that the perception of water quality to which property owners implicitly apply value should be considered when establishing water-quality regulations. 相似文献
We study the stochastic stability of a dynamic trading process in an exchange economy. We use a simplified version of a trading
model à la Shapley and Shubik (J Polit Econ 85:937–968, 1977). Two types of agents equipped with Leontief preferences trade goods in markets by offering endowments, and actual trades
occur at market clearing prices. Better behavior tends to spread through the same type of agents by imitation, and agents
also make mistakes occasionally. We provide a sufficient condition for the perturbed dynamic process to have a unique stochastically
stable state that is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. In this sense, we give a rationale for Walrasian behavior. 相似文献