The Case of the Missing Pollution Haven Hypothesis

One particularly vexing puzzle for economists and policymakers over the past several decades concerns the empirical significance of the theoretically predicted pollution haven hypothesis. While neoclassical theory and conventional wisdom both surmise that local economies will suffer deleterious effects from stricter environmental regulations, empirical studies have largely failed to validate such claims. This study utilizes the method of matching to show that the impact of stricter regulation is heterogeneous spatially, varying systematically based on location-specific attributes. Previous studies that assume a homogenous response may therefore inadvertently mask the overall impact of more stringent regulations by pooling unaffected and affected regions.JEL Classification: Q25, Q28, H00, L51, R1The authors wish to thank to Michael Crew, Anthony Heyes, an anonymous referee, Werner Antweiler, Randy Becker, Wayne Gray, Shelby Gerking, Michael Greenstone, Vern Henderson, and Arik Levinson. Participants at various university seminars and conferences also lent useful insights to this line of research.     

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.     

OCCUPATIONAL EARNINGS BEHAVIOR AND THE INEQUALITY OF EARNINGS BY SEX AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES*

This paper examines differences in earnings by occupations, and within occupations by sex and by race, on the basis of the 1/100 Public Use Samples of the 1960 and 1970 U.S. Population Censuses. It employs interval analysis to establish 32 categories of occupations with similar characteristics. Little relation was found between mean earnings of occupational groups and the degree of earnings inequality within them. When the figures are examined by sex, it was found that men, on average, earned over twice as much as women in both years, but women's earnings were more unequally distributed (as measured by the Gini coefficient). Women are concentrated in the traditional “female” occupations, which tend to be those at the bottom of the earnings scale, and men have a monopoly of the higher paid occupations. But mean earnings for men exceeded those for women in all occupational groups except one, even in the primarily female occupations. Standardizing first for occupational distribution and then for earnings by occupation, it was found that earnings differences between males and females within occupation had a greater impact on the overall male-female earnings ratio than did differences in occupational distribution by sex. In contrast, when the figures are examined by race, the change in occupational distribution (primarily the movement of blacks out of farming and of blacks and Spanish speakers out of personal services) was the major factor. There was also a considerable degree of earnings inequality within demographic groups. The degree of inequality was in the main reduced when the demographic groups were subdivided into occupations, but it was still substantial. Additional factors like time worked, schooling, and experience must be taken into consideration in understanding this phenomenon.     

The Economics and Bioeconomics of Folk and Scientific Classification

Synopsis This paper is the product of a collaboration between a biologist (Ghiselin 1997) who works on the philosophy of classification and an economist (Landa 1981, 1994) who works on the ‘Economics of Identity’: how and why people classify people based on identity in the context of a theory of ethnic trading networks. In developing the ‘bioeconomics’ (the synthesis of economics with biology) of classification, we crossed a number of disciplinary boundaries—anthropology, economics, sociology, biology, and cognitive psychology including evolutionary psychology’s ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics. Using a bioeconomics approach, we argue that folk classifications—the classifications used by ordinary persons—have much in common with scientific classifications: underlying both is the need for economy of information processing in the brain, for the efficient organization of knowledge, and for efficiency of information acquisition and transmission of information to others. Both evolve as a result of trial and error, but in science there is relatively more foresight, understanding, and planning.     

Una nuova caratterizzatione dell'ammissibilità nella teoria delle decisioni

In questo lavoro viene fornita una nuova caratterizzazione dell'ammissibilità attraverso un adeguato uso della nozione di ammissibilità parziale. Questa caratterizzazione consente di affrontare le questioni riguardanti la completezza della classe delle decisioni ammissibiliti sotto condizioni «maneggevoli». Fornisce inoltre un approccio unificante al problema della completezza che consente di derivare, come casi particolari, alcuni risultati già noti nella letteratura sull'argomento.

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In this paper a new characterization of admissibility is given for general decision problems. It is based on an adequate use of the notion of partial admissibility.A general decision problem is usually synthetized by a triplet (, , ) where is the states (or parameters) space, the set of available decisions and is a family of real valued functions defined on and expressing numerically the consequences of choosing when the state is . The set is regarded as a subset of the space of all real valued functions on endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence.As for as admissibility is concerned all the pertinent information about decisions are contained in the corresponding functionsW .This allows to introduce a notion of partial admissibility through the neigh-bourhoods of this topology. Admissibile decisions are then shown to be limits of monotone non increasing sequences of partially admissible decisions.Moreover this topological characterization allows to prove the completeness of classes of admissible decisions under acceptable systems of conditions which contain as special cases, known results in literature.

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Lavoro svolto nell'ambito del Gruppo Nazionale per l'Analisi Funzionale e le sue Applicazioni del C.N.R.     

Revisiting managerial perspectives on dividend policy

We survey managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy, the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for paying dividends. The evidence shows that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity and widely agree that changes in dividends affect firm value. Managers give the strongest support to a signaling explanation for paying dividends, weak to little support for the tax-preference and agency cost explanations, and no support to the bird-in-the-hand explanation. The study provides new evidence about how managers view dividend life cycles and residual dividend policy. The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, and Maheshan Fernando and Sumeet Chawla for providing research assistance.     

Characterizations of distributions via linearity of regression of generalized order statistics

Let X (r, n, m, k), 1 r n, denote generalized order statistics based on an absolutely continuous distribution function F. We characterize all distribution functions F for which the following linearity of regression holds E(X(r+l,n,m,k) | X(r,n,m,k))=aX(r,n,m,k)+b.We show that only exponential, Pareto and power distributions satisfy this equation. Using this result one can obtain characterizations of exponential, Pareto and power distributions in terms of sequential order statistics, Pfeifers records and progressive type II censored order statistics. Received July 2001/Revised August 2002     

Regulation of Mobile Telephony across the European Union: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper I analyze the impact of regulatory policy on prices and demand for mobile telecommunications services across the European Union. I estimate a reduced form model of the mobile industry using panel data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. Among others, I find the following effects: liberalization of fixed telephone lines has a negative impact on prices and a positive impact on the demand for mobile services, and the introduction of mobile number portability has a negative impact on prices.*I am grateful to Toker Doganoglu, Gerd Hansen, Eric Kodjo Ralph, Guido Friebel, participants at the 30th EARIE Conference 2003, the 2nd International Industrial Organization Conference 2004 and the 19th Annual Congress of the EEA 2004, and anonymous referees for valuable comments. I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Munich Graduate School of Economics which made this research possible. All errors are mine.1 Source: European Commission (1994).     

Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author.