Explaining the effect of financial development on the quality of property rights

Empirical evidence suggests that financial development can catalyze property rights reforms. This paper offers a theory of financial markets to explain these facts defining the relationship. The explanation is based on a simple trade‐off between the costs and the benefits of securing property. Securing the right to property at a cost allows agents to post collateral against loans. However, the benefits of collateral vary according to the existing credit market conditions, which we take into account in the tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of securing property rights along the path of financial development to explain the conditions under which financial development can create incentives for better property rights institutions.     

My American Cousin: A Comparison Between Indian and the U.S. Malls

Malls came into existence because of changing patterns of urbanization and ways of living. The concept has traveled from the United States to the world over. Initially, the acceptance and awareness of malls was moderate in India, but there has been a spur in the proliferation of malls during recently. Indian malls are not an exact replica of the U.S. malls: the U.S. model has been modified resulting in development of India-specific prototypes. Indian malls differ from U.S. malls in terms of financing, location, size, expansion, architecture, stage of evolution, choice of anchor tenant, entertainment-mix, and mall management practices.     

A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity

We study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity. We assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion; in particular, they are represented by the epsilon-contamination model. We show that a simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction can extract almost all surplus. This contrasts with optimal auctions under IPV without ambiguity as well as with optimal static auctions with ambiguity—in all of these, types other than the lowest participating type obtain a positive surplus. An important point of departure is that the modified Dutch mechanism is dynamic rather than static, establishing that under ambiguity aversion—even when the setting is IPV in all other respects—a dynamic mechanism can have additional bite over its static counterparts. A further general insight is that the standard revelation principle does not automatically extend to environments not characterized by subjective expected utility.     

Asymmetric Cointegration,Nonlinear ARDL,and the J-Curve: A Bilateral Analysis of China and Its 21 Trading Partners

This article follows the nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) error-correction methodology to explore nonlinearity in the relationship between the trade balances and the real exchange rates for China and its 21 partners. We find evidence for short-run asymmetric effects of exchange rate in cases of 18 partners, short-run adjustment asymmetry in cases of 11 partners, short-run cumulative asymmetry in cases of seven partners, and a significant long-run asymmetric effect cases of five partners. We find support for the “J-curve” that is only due to appreciation or depreciation of the Yuan in cases of five partners, including the U.S.     

The role of manufacturing practices in mediating the impact of activity-based costing on plant performance

We study the impact of activity-based costing (ABC) on adoption of world-class manufacturing (WCM) practices and plant performance. In contrast to earlier research that estimates the direct impact of ABC on plant performance, we develop an alternative research model to study the role of world-class manufacturing practices as a mediator of the impact of ABC. Analysis of data from a large cross-sectional sample of US manufacturing plants indicates that ABC has no significant direct impact on plant performance, as measured by improvements in unit manufacturing costs, cycle time, and product quality. We find, however, that WCM practices completely mediate the positive impact of ABC on plant performance, and thus advanced manufacturing capabilities represent a critical missing link in understanding the overall impact of ABC. Our results provide a different conceptual lens to evaluate the relationship between ABC adoption and plant performance, and suggest that ABC adoption by itself does not improve plant performance.     

The Effects of Negatively Valenced Emotional Expressions in Online Reviews on the Reviewer,the Review,and the Product

The authors examine the effects of negatively valenced emotional expressions (NVEE; e.g., intense language, all caps, exclamation points, emoticons) in online reviews and reveal important boundary conditions for their effects. Specifically, Study 1 showed that NVEE directly promote review helpfulness and damage attitude toward the product when used by experts. In contrast, for novices, their use of NVEE was considered a poor reflection on them and failed to directly affect attitude toward the product. Further, attributions of reviewer rationality and trustworthiness were positively associated with review helpfulness and attitude toward the product. Interestingly, language complexity is a trigger to reverse the effects, as found in Study 2. For novices (experts), the adverse effect on trustworthiness is eliminated (introduced) but the adverse effect on attitude toward the product is introduced (eliminated) when they include more complex language accompanied by NVEE in their online reviews. Both studies uncover when source discounting is active for experts and novices, making them equally influential in some cases. Theoretical and managerial implications are provided.     

Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

A sender‐receiver game a la Crawford‐Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff‐relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa.     

Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible

We study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent's transfers on the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agent's types. Crémer and McLean [Econometrica 53(1985) 345-361; 56(1988) 1247-1257], McAfee and Reny [Econometrica 60(2)(1992) 395-421], and Riordan and Sappington [J. Econ. Theory, 45(1988) 189-199] studied situations where the signals are such that full surplus can be extracted from every agent type. We study optimal utilization of the signals when there are fewer signals than types and the Riordan and Sappington conditions do not always hold. For some special cases, we show the level of surplus that can be extracted, and identify the agent types who obtain rent.     

Credence Goods,Efficient Labelling Policies,and Regulatory Enforcement

We analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of “credence goods” via alternative labelling procedures. When consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute, producers can either self-label their products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the “green” or the “brown” producers. Our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information. We extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that mandatory self-labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling, unless the “market share effect” greatly exceeds the “incentive-to-cheat effect”.