Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*

In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.     

Productivity and technical change: the case of Taiwan

This paper analyses productivity growth in 16 of Taiwan's manufacturing industries during the period 1978–1992. The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis approach is used to compute Malmquist productivity indexes. These are decomposed into efficiency change and technical change. The latter is further decomposed into an output bias, an input bias and a magnitude component. In addition, the direction of input bias is identified. Empirical results indicate that the sector's TFP increased at a rate of 2.89% per annum, which could be ascribed to a technical progress (2.56%) and an efficiency improvement (0.33%).     

Erhöht Solvency II den Bedarf an Rückversicherung im Schaden-/Unfallgeschäft in Deutschland?

Reinsurers and reinsurance brokers are often of the opinion that the introduction of Solvency II will lead to changes in how re-insurance is purchased. Our analysis of these assumptions for the German property and casualty insurance market lead to a market survey. This survey revealed that overall the participating insurance companies expect no significant changes for their companies, although they do anticipate changes in buying patterns of the rest of the market and in the overall market environment. This paper examines the reasons for this difference in expectations between those of individual companies and those of the overall market.     

Indices for Working Land Conservation: Form Affects Function

Using environmental indices (EIs) to rank applications for enrollment in conservation programs is becoming common practice. However, there is little guidance on how it should be done. The indices adopted by existing programs have often been linear, using weighted averages of environmental parameters without explicit consideration of whether they represent a reliable preference ordering on environmental states. Our article investigates society's weights for addressing multiple resource concerns and how functional forms of EIs can influence program outcomes. We propose a means by which preference weights are observed from policymaker actions. Weights for multiple resource concerns are determined and combined with biophysical crop simulation data to create an environmental index (EI) for crop rotations. This index is developed using alternative function forms to score conservation efforts on working cropland and to measure their effect on program outcomes.     

Information Cascades in the Labor Market

A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good.