欧洲单一金融市场中的最后贷款人(LLR)

本文研究在欧盟单一金融市场中有效发挥最后贷款人功能所面临的挑战.简要分析了欧盟金融业的一些特点,这些特点可能增加欧盟系统性金融风险;讨论了预防和解决金融问题的欧盟金融稳定构架的复杂性(最后贷款人的运作也包括在这个构架之中);论述了当系统性金融风波影响不止一个欧盟成员国时,如何实现最后贷款人功能.最后提出了提高现有构架效率所面临的挑战和可行的途径.     

Do Australian Trade Policies Discriminate Against Less Developed Countries?*

The view that Australian protection discriminates against the less developed countries (LDCs) is examined in this paper. It distinguishes between direct discrimination through tariff preferences and indirect discrimination through inter-commodity differences in rates of protection. The second mechanism proves to be more important. While Australian protection did not discriminate against the LDCs in 1968–49, by 1977–78 it did. This reflects changes in the commodity composition of Australia's imports from the LDC_S.     

A comparison of alternative methods of updating input-output coefficients

In recent years there has been a growing number of input-output models of economies ranging in scale from the rural to the national. While offering invaluable insights into the interaction of sectors within an economy, the input-output model suffers from the fact that its coefficient values are altered over time due particularly to technological change. Two of the prominent techniques designed to update these technical coefficients, the RAS and linear programming methods, are compared herein with regard to changes in U.S. national coefficients between 1963 and 1967. Suggestions for improvements to the latter method are outlined.     

Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems. Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments. Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark     

Specification and Estimation of ELES

The Extended Linear Expenditure System b reformulated to yield private per capita net worth as the basic explanatory variable. As a by-product the model implies that the marginal propensity to consume/save out of permanent income varies with the rate of interest. In the estimation, account is taken of inconsistencies in data compiled from different sources by explicity including the savings relationship in the system. Parameter estimates based on Australian data are presented.     

Anonymous sequential games: Existence and characterization of equilibria

Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide Markov representations of the equilibria.Table of notation Agents' characteristics space ( ) - A Action space of each agent (aA) - Y Y = x A - Aggregate distribution on agents' characteristics - (X) Space of probability measures onX - C(X) Space of continuous functions onX - _X Family of Borel sets ofX - State space of aggregate uncertainty ( ) - x _t=1 aggregate uncertainty for the infinite game - = (₁,₂,...,_t,...) - ^{t t} (₁, ₂,..., _t) - L₁(^t,C ×A),v _t Normed space of measurable functions from ^t toC( x A) - 8o(^t,( x A)) Space of measurable functions from ^tto( x A) - X^t X^t= x _s=1 ^t X - _X ^t Borel field onX ^t - v Distribution on - v_t Marginal distribution of v on ^t - v(^t)((¦^t)) Conditional distribution on given ^t - v^t(^s)(v_t(¦^s)) Conditional distribution on ^t given ^s (wheres) - _t Periodt distributional strategy - Distributional strategy for all periods =(₁,₂,...,_t,...) - _t Transition process for agents' types - ( _t,^t,y)(P _t+1(, _t , ^t ,y)) Transition function associated with _t - u _t Utility function - V _t (, a, , ^t) Value function for each collection (, a, , ^t ) - W _t (, , ^t ) Value function given optimal action a - C() Consistency correspondence. Distributions consistent with and characteristics transition functions - B() Best response correspondence (which also satisfy consistency) - E Set of equilibrium distributional strategies - x _t=1 ( ^t , (x A)) - S Expanded state space for Markov construction - (, a, ) Value function for Markov construction - P( _t ^* , _t y)(P(, _t ^* , _t , _y )) Invariant characteristics transition function for Markov game We wish to acknowledge very helpful conversations with C. d'Aspremont, B. Lipman, A. McLennan and J-F. Mertens. The financial support of the SSHRCC and the ARC at Queen's University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was begun while the first author visited CORE. The financial support of CORE and the excellent research environment is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Income determination in market disequilibrium: The implications of spillover for the design of monetary policy

This paper specifies and analyzes a generalized disequilibrium macroeconomic model that explicitly includes the concept of spillover in nontatonnement financial and real markets. It is shown that the dynamic quantity and expenditure theories of income determination are special cases of the model which depend upon the degree of spillover from the bond to the commodity market. Simulation experiments designed to produce a vigorous monetary shock to the system clearly show that national product is very sensitive to the degree of spillover, and thus, the design of monetary policy within the context of gradual market clearing should consider the size of spillover.     

Austrian Economics and Public Choice

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

Trade and Industry Policy

This article consists of a review of changes in trade and industry policy, along with discussions of the determinants of change and the major problem areas. Policy between 1965 and 1985 is summarised, and the growth of unemployment in the 1970s is suggested as a key determinant of change. Higher protection in certain industries, and moves to more quantitative methods ot protection can be related to unemployment, in Australia as in other countries. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that protection is likely to prove ineffective in reducing unemployment. The reliance on protection in particular cases is ascribed to a wish by governments to preserve specific jobs, not to increase overall employment. Policy can have a role in facilitating or restricting structural change which can arise from several sources, such as changing trade patterns and preferences. The devices of policy are considered briefly to determine whether they are likely to facilitate change or not. It is concluded that they often provide incentives to avoid change. The scale problem is considered, and it is suggested that the cost of protection could be high in industries subject to significant scale economies. Scale and adjustments are considered in the light of two industries, motor vehicles and whitegoods, and the role of industry plans is examined. The actuality of trade and industry policy often differs from announced intentions, and this ambiguity can give rise to uncertainty which itself has a cost.