THE NEED TO REFORM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM

The biggest financial disaster in modern history struck the savings and loan industry during the 1980s. This paper argues that the unifying cause of this debacle was the way in which the federal deposit insurance system is structured. The fundamental cause was not fraud and deregulation, as is commonly argued. The government not only permitted reportedly insolvent institutions to continue to operate, it permitted many such institutions to grow by offering relatively high rates on their deposits. Unfortunately, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 may not prevent a similar situation from ever recurring. Therefore, one must understand exactly what happened, what the FIRREA does and does not do, and the proposals for reforming the entire structure of the federal deposit insurance system.     

When a Gain Comes at a Price: Pay Attitudes after Changing Tier Status

This study compares attitudes toward pay and work of employees who changed from the high tier to the low tier after transferring jobs from low-to high-paying departments with those who similarly transferred but did not change tiers. The former had lower Pay Satisfaction than the latter, but they did not differ in Job Satisfaction and Union and Employer Commitment. The findings suggest that the change-tier employees' loss of high-tier status was a likely reason for their pay dissatisfaction.     

Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open‐market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open‐market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.     

The Impact of Employee Stock Option Adoption and Incidence on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. Panel Data

This paper examines the productivity effect of broad‐based and executive stock option programs in adoption year and five subsequent years. The findings include a positive impact on productivity, which is maintained over a five‐year period after adoption for executive plans but diminishes immediately for broad‐based plans. We interpret these findings as evidence of stock option usage being of benefit to organizations. However, to sustain the impact of broad‐based plans options, grants may need to be made with the same frequency as executive option grants.     

Earnings,Book Values,and Dividends in a Stewardship Setting with Moral Hazard*

The paper addresses the following question: in a multiple-date agency setting, under what conditions will the dividend policy be of no incentive relevancy? It is shown that if the accounting data—earnings, book values, and dividends — satisfy standard owners' equity accounting constructs, and if these indicate that paying dividends is a zero NPV activity, then dividend policy incentive irrelevancy applies. The basic idea is to ensure that the (history of) abnormal (residual) earnings summarize the relevant information and the solution to the incentive problem. The paper also compares classical value irrelevancy with incentive irrelevancy, and the analysis shows that conditions for incentive irrelevancy are more stringent.     

Nominal GDP Targeting with Heterogeneous Labor Supply

We study nominal gross domestic product (GDP) targeting as optimal monetary policy in a model with a credit market friction following Azariadis et al. (2018), henceforth ABSS. We extend the ABSS framework to allow for heterogeneous labor supply. We show that nominal GDP targeting continues to characterize optimal monetary policy in this setting. We also analyze the incomplete markets equilibrium that exists when the monetary policymaker pursues a suboptimal policy, and show how an extension to more general preferences can limit the ability of the policymaker to provide full insurance to households in this setting.     

Banks' Strategic Responses to Supervisory Coverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

U.S. bank supervisors conduct frequent and comprehensive loan-level exams of the syndicated loan market. These exams are costly as adverse exam loan ratings may increase supervisory scrutiny and reduce bank capital. Relying on an unexpected change in supervisory coverage in 1998, we estimate that the cost of bank credit for borrowers excluded from supervision decreases by approximately 18%. We show that large lenders use the coverage change to exclude deals from supervision, especially riskier deals. Strikingly, small lenders shift their lending to increase supervisory coverage, suggesting the potential importance of supervision in reducing information asymmetries within lending syndicates.