REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT DISPARITIES: AN EVALUATION OF POLICY MEASURES*

This paper analyses the efficacy of regional and federal government policies in reducing inter‐regional unemployment disparities. We use as our framework a two‐region general equilibrium model with a given freely‐mobile supply of labour. We assume inter‐regional migration to occur in response to inter‐regional utility differentials. Each region has households, firms and a regional government. In addition to regional governments, there is a federal government. The firms in a region use a single factor, labour, to produce a single good which we assume to be different to that produced in the other region. It is supplied to households and to the regional government in the form of payroll taxes. Households consume some, trade some with households in the other region and give some up to the federal government as income tax. Firms and households bargain over wages and firms then choose employment to maximise profits. The resulting equilibrium will generally not be a full‐employment one. We simulate a linearised numerical version of the model. We examine seven alternative policies, six carried out by a regional government and one by the federal government. In the first group there are traditional tax/expenditure polices as well as policies which might be seen as attacking the natural rate of unemployment: changes in unemployment benefits, changes in union power, changes in the labour force and changes in labour productivity. The federal government policy is a regionally‐differentiated fiscal policy. Contrary to expectations, many policies which have traditionally been recommended to alleviate unemployment are found, in fact, to exacerbate the unemployment problem.     

Millian Efficiency with Endogenous Fertility

Should governments implement policies that affect fertility decisions on efficiency grounds? What is the correct notion of efficiency to use? To address these issues, this paper develops an extension of the notion of Pareto efficiency, referred to as Millian efficiency , to evaluate symmetric allocations in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility. This extension is based on preferences of those agents who are actually alive, and exclusively allows for welfare comparisons of symmetric allocations. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether an allocation is Millian efficient or not, and we show that the sufficient conditions for dynamic efficiency offered by Cass (1972) and Balasko and Shell (1980) cannot be directly applied when fertility decisions are endogenous. Second, we characterize Millian efficient allocations as the equilibria of a decentralized price mechanism, and we present a sufficient condition for dynamic efficiency that uses the sequence of prices associated to such decentralized equilibria. Finally, we analyse how intergenerational policies should be designed to restore efficiency and achieve net welfare gains in two different settings in which markets yield inefficient allocations: dynamic inefficiencies and financial market incompleteness regarding human capital. In the former, a pay-as-you-go social security system eliminates dynamic inefficiencies, provided pensions are explicitly linked with fertility decisions. In the latter, a specific link between social security and public education becomes a necessary condition for Millian efficiency.     

Multi-Product Firms and Flexible Manufacturing in the Global Economy

We present a new model of multi-product firms (MPFs) and flexible manufacturing, and explore its implications in partial and general oligopolistic equilibrium. Globalization affects the scale and scope (or intensive margin and intra-firm extensive margin) of MPFs through a competition effect and a demand effect. The model highlights a new source of gains from trade: productivity increases as firms become "leaner and meaner", concentrating on their core competence; but also a new source of losses from trade: product variety may fall. Our results also hold under free entry, which allows in addition for adjustment along the traditional inter-firm extensive margin.     

发展中国家的普遍服务政策

该文构建非对称信息模型分析普遍服务政策问题,其中政府对企业在农村提供服务的边际成本具有非对称信息.该文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析.在实施区别定价时,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且降低相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但却是以网络覆盖的减少为代价的.该文的政策结论是:在实施普遍服务政策时,需要综合考虑网络投资的激励和用户承受能力.     

Toward ‘Wisely Managed’ Capitalism: Post-Keynesian Institutionalism and the Creative State

Post-Keynesian Institutionalism (PKI), a synthesis of post Keynesian and institutional economics, emerged in the USA as a strand of evolutionary economics in the early 1980s and has attracted increasing attention in recent years. This article examines milestones in the development of PKI, devoting particular attention to the tradition’s conception of the role of the state. The first section identifies antecedents to PKI in the writings of John R. Commons and John Maynard Keynes. The second describes how PKI emerged against the backdrop of increasing dissatisfaction with neoclassical Keynesianism in the era of stagflation. The third summarizes the subsequent contributions of Hyman P. Minsky, whose work was a model of PKI in the 1980s and 1990s. The final two sections outline PKI’s contemporary characteristics and identify elements of an agenda for future research. PKI has always been about achieving a more humane form of capitalism, which requires the state to play a creative role in shaping economic life.

Incremental and Average Control Costs in a Model of Water Quality Trading with Discrete Abatement Units

This paper answers three questions related to the discrete nature of pollution abatement: (i) does a source’s incremental control cost (as defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) necessarily exceed its average control cost, (ii) is incremental control cost a better approximation of a source’s willingness to pay for abatement credits than average control cost, and (iii) exactly how does trading in discrete and continuous abatement markets differ? We find that the answer to the first two questions are both “no”, suggesting that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency needs to refine its reliance on incremental control cost as the sole measure upon which to assess the financial feasibility of water quality trading. In answer to the third question, we show that the outcome of bilateral trading in the presence of discrete abatement is determined by comparing the gains from trade associated with the full sequence of possible “sunk cost trading” scenarios. For the most common case where trading partners’ average control cost curves “cross,” the trading outcome with discrete abatement is inherently sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities.     

Differentiating ambiguity: an expository note

Ghirardato et al. J Econ Theory 118:133–173, 2004 propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker’s reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. This note presents some examples which illustrate their results. Research supported by ESRC grant no. RES-000-22-0650. For comments and discussion we would like to thank Klaus Nehring and a seminar audience at ESEM, Vienna 2006.     

UPSTREAM MARKET FORECLOSURE

This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyse two polar cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being supplied inelastically. We show that this situation opens the door to entry deterrence. Then, we assume that the input is supplied by a single seller who chooses the input price. In this case, we show that entry deterrence can be reached only through merger with the seller of the input.