Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market Efficiency

How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private information into stock prices and improves the allocation of capital. Several implications are derived and tested.     

Bargaining Effects of the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction

This study uses a laboratory experiment to examine empirically the effect of the mandatory permissive distinction on the negotiation of wages, employment guarantees, and advertising expenditures. Results suggest that negotiators spend more time bargaining over a smaller settlement range when an issue is mandatory than when it is permissive. Further, tentative findings provide no evidence that negotiators can circumvent the distinction through the use of tradeoffs across issues or bargaining power.     

One Security,Many Markets: Determining the Contributions to Price Discovery

When homogeneous or closely-linked securities trade in multiple markets, it is often of interest to determine where price discovery (the incorporation of new information) occurs. This article suggests an econometric approach based on an implicit unobservable efficient price common to all markets. The information share associated with a particular market is defined as the proportional contribution of that market's innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price. Applied to quotes for the thirty Dow stocks, the technique suggests that the preponderance of the price discovery takes place at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (a median 92.7 percent information share).