The Time Variation of Risk and Return in the Foreign Exchange and Stock Markets

This paper attempts to determine whether the fluctuations of conditional first and second moments—which are observed for many assets—are consistent with the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin capital asset pricing model. We test the mean-variance model under several different assumptions about the time variation of conditional second moments of returns, using weekly data from July 1974 to December 1986, that include returns on a portfolio composed of dollar, Deutsche mark, sterling, and Swiss franc assets, together with the U.S. stock market. The results indicate that estimated conditional variances cannot explain the observed time variation of risk premia.     

Cream‐Skimming in Financial Markets

We propose a model in which investors may choose to acquire costly information that identifies good assets and purchase these assets in opaque (OTC) markets. Uninformed investors access an asset pool that has been cream‐skimmed by informed investors. When the quality composition of assets for sale is fixed, there is too much information acquisition and the financial industry extracts excessive rents. In the presence of moral hazard in origination, the social value of information varies inversely with information acquisition. Low quality origination is associated with large rents in the financial sector. Equilibrium acquisition of information is generically inefficient.     

Nonoptimality of the Friedman Rule with Capital Income Taxation

This paper studies the efficient taxation of money and factor income in intertemporal optimizing growth models with infinite horizons, transaction costs technologies, and flexible prices. Second‐best optimality calls for a positive inflation tax and a nonzero capital income tax when there are restrictions on taxation of production factors or profits/rents. Our cases of nonoptimality of the Friedman rule—which differ from those of Mulligan and Sala‐i‐Martin (1997) and extend substantially those of Schmitt‐Grohè and Uribe (2004a) —follow from the violation of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) principle on production efficiency.     

International Evidence on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve Using Aggregate and Disaggregate Data

We present a unique empirical analysis of the properties of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) using an international data set of aggregate and disaggregate sectoral inflation. Our results from panel time‐series estimation clearly indicate that sectoral heterogeneity has important consequences for aggregate inflation behavior. Heterogeneity helps to explain the overestimation of inflation persistence and underestimation of the role of marginal costs in empirical investigations of the NKPC that use aggregate data. We find that combining disaggregate information with heterogeneous‐consistent estimation techniques helps to reconcile, to a large extent, the NKPC with the data.     

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.     

USING PSEUDO‐PANELS TO MEASURE INCOME MOBILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

This paper presents a comparative overview of mobility patterns in 14 Latin American countries between 1992 and 2003. Using three alternative econometric techniques on constructed pseudo‐panels, the paper provides a set of estimators for the traditional notion of income mobility as well as for mobility around extreme and moderate poverty lines. The estimates suggest very high levels of time‐dependent unconditional immobility for the Region. However, the introduction of socioeconomic and personal factors reduces the estimate of income immobility by around 30 percent. There are also large variations in country‐specific income mobility (estimated to explain some additional 10 percent of inter‐temporal income variation). Analyzing the determinants of changes in poverty incidence within cohorts revealed statistically significant roles for age, gender, and education of the household head, the latter subject to distinctive effects across levels of attainment and transition in and out of poverty.     

Designing Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Some Insights from the Recent Italian Reform

During the last decade, the Italian system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has been involved in a radical process of reform that is still under way. The reform has assigned Regions new taxing powers and has introduced a new system of interregional transfers. This paper provides a review of the recent reform and offers some tentative answers to the issues still open, relying on a series of simulations and projections. A number of conclusions have been reached. First, when the long‐run performance of the new financing systems is investigated, regional resources may no longer be adequate to meet future health needs. Second, the incentives for active tax policies seem either to prove too weak or even to cause undesirable results. Finally, the complete devolution to the Regions of some significant public expenditure functions risks strengthening the polarisation of financial flows between the Northern and Southern Regions in the long run.     

Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry

Using a unique data set, we document two secular trends in the shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management over the past few decades. First, across asset classes, sponsors replace generalist balanced managers with better‐performing specialists. Second, within asset classes, funds replace single managers with multiple competing managers following diverse strategies to reduce scale diseconomies as funds grow larger relative to capital markets. Consistent with a model of decentralized management, sponsors implement risk controls that trade off higher anticipated alphas of multiple specialists against the increased difficulty in coordinating their risk‐taking and the greater uncertainty concerning their true skills.     

Beliefs and Public Good Provision with Anonymous Contributors

We analyze a static game of public good contributions where finitely many anonymous players have heterogeneous preferences about the public good and heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of preferences. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the only individuals who make positive contributions are those who most value the public good and who are also the most pessimistic; that is, according to their beliefs, the proportion of players who most like the public good is smaller than it would be according to any other possible belief. We predict whether the aggregate contribution is larger or smaller than it would be in an analogous game with complete information and heterogeneous preferences, by comparing the beliefs of contributors with the true distribution of preferences. A trade‐off between preferences and beliefs arises if there is no individual who simultaneously has the highest preference type and the most pessimistic belief. In this case, there is a symmetric equilibrium, and multiple symmetric equilibria occur only if there are more than two preference types.