College Students’ Responses to Antismoking Messages: Denial,Defiance, and Other Boomerang Effects

Despite the success of antismoking campaigns that aim to prevent young teens from smoking, this qualitative study provides strong evidence that different initiatives are needed for college students, particularly those who already smoke. When asked for responses to current antismoking messages, nonsmokers generally championed the cause; however, smokers often responded with anger, defiance, denial, and other negative responses. Consumers who respond in this manner are not well served by existing strategies, and money used for such campaigns could be better spent. New strategies are offered in hopes that antismoking campaigns can communicate more effectively with one high‐risk group—college student smokers.     

Using Experimental Economics to Resolve Accounting Dilemmas*

Abstract. Experimental economics is an increasingly important tool in accounting research. This paper examines how the accounting experimentalists' expertise in design, institutional knowledge, and theory can be used to enlighten policy debate. Two recent economics-based experiments examining tax policy and audit education are used to highlight these ideas and show where careful attention to theory would shift the direction of research, making it more applicable to contemporary policy issues. Résumé. L'économique expérimentale est un instrument de plus en plus important en recherche comptable. L'auteure examine comment les aptitudes des expérimentateurs comptables en ce qui a trait à la définition des problématiques, leur connaissance des institutions et leur bagage théorique peuvent servir à éclairer le débat politique. Deux expériences récentes qui s'appuient sur l'économique portent sur la politique fiscale et la formation des vérificateurs et son employées pour jeter un nouvel éclairage sur ces idées et pour illustrer comment l'intérêt pour la théorie devrait modifier le cours de la recherche, en la rendant davantage applicable aux problèmes politiques contemporains.     

Governing Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation

In a contest of group‐specific public goods we consider the effect that managing an interest group has on the rent dissipation and the total expected payoffs of the contest. While in the first group there is a central planner determining its members’ expenditure in the contest, in the second group there are two different possibilities: either all the members are governed by a central planner or they are not. We consider both types of contests: an all‐pay auction and a Logit contest success function. We show that while governing an interest group decreases free‐riding, it may as well decrease the rent dissipation; at the same time the expected payoffs of the groups may also decrease.     

EFFECT OF FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN PRICE FIXING

This article examines price fixing and bid rigging by applying the theory of the economics of crime to explain the calculus of the individual decision maker in the firm. This approach departs somewhat from the traditional approach to investigations of collusion. The latter has emphasized market structure and firm interrelationships while it has ignored the characteristics of the firm itself. But analyses ignoring firm organizational and financial structure are incomplete insomuch as these factors are crucial to the incentives and costs that the decision maker confronts. This paper offers an alternative approach in which price-fixing and bid-rigging offenders' prominent characteristics apparently are mirrored in defendant firms and individuals that the Antitrust Division has prosecuted recentlv.     

Distinguishing the two forms of the constant percentage learning curve model

Abstract. There is often evidence of confusion between two forms of the constant percentage learning curve model: the cumulative average and the individual unit forms. Failure to distinguish between the two models can lead to their misuse and to potentially serious errors of estimation. A precise statement of the difference between the two clarifies the errors of misspecification. This note provides an analytical comparsion of the two models and addresses empirical estimation issues. Résumé. On a souvent la preuve de la confusion entre deux formules de modèle de la courbe d'apprentissage à pourcentage constant: celle de la moyenne cumulative et celle de l'unité individuelle. Le fait de ne pas distinguer les deux modèles peut conduire à une mauvaise utilisation et éventuellement à de sérieuses erreurs d'estimation. Un examen précis de la différence entre les deux peut clarifier les erreurs de spécification. Cet article présente une comparaison analytique des deux modèles et traite des questions d'estimation empirique.     

Consumer Complaints as Pre-purchase Information: An Evaluation of Better Business Bureau Reports to Consumers

Consumer complaints can be used as pre-purchase information. A major way in which this currently works is through Better Business Bureau reports to consumers on particular business firms. Case studies for the Consumer Complaint Study and two tests carried out in 1976 reconfirm the 1971 Rosenthal study conclusion that such BBB reports are “misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete.” The basic explanation of this poor quality of BBB reports continues to be the operation of BBBs in the interests of the conventional business world.