Wage inequality, technology, and trade

The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countries are endogenously determined. The model sheds light on the relationship between technology and trade, on the reasons for global productivity differences and on the causes for the recent rise in wage inequality.     

Social learning with private and common values

Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.Received: 6 January 2005, Revised: 5 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.Jacob K. Goeree: Correspondence toFinancial support from the National Science Foundation NSF (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Richard McKelvey posthumously for insights and conjectures about information aggregation that helped shape our thinking about the problem. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Kim Border, Tilman Börgers, Bogachen Celen, Luis Corchon, Matthew Jackson and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Arizona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the California Institute of Technology, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the 2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, and the 2003 ESSET meetings in Gerzensee.     

CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision

Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short‐term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity‐based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ratings and confirmation

We present a formalism which makes explicit and precise the confirming effect of multiple observers and repeated trials on composite ratings, considering the relevant subjective inputs.     

Local public goods with mobility: Existence and optimality of a general equilibrium

The existence and optimality of a general equilibrium in a model with a finite number of locations among which the continuum of individuals (each individual belonging to one of a finite number of types) have to choose is investigated. Each community finances its own production of public goods by taxes. The way in which the tax burden in shared among the different types in the different regions is left arbitrary. The model allows for: restrictions on the mobility of either residents and/or workers, congestion and externalities in both production and consumption, commuting costs, preferences of an individual may also depend on his location as well as on the distribution of all individuals across locations.     

Economic determinants of Soviet foreign trade with Eastern Europe

Using a cross-sectionally correlated and time-wise autoregressive pooling procedure, we have obtained long-run estimates of export and import elasticities of Soviet-East European bilateral trade with respect to supply, demand and trade resistance factors. Our results indicate that Soviet exports to East Europe during 1963–1973 was, for most product groups, determined by demand conditions found in the East European partner countries while Soviet imports from Eastern Europe, for the same period, was for most product groups determined by East European supplies.     

Rising marginal cost and concavity of the production function

Suppose a production function, f, is continuous, quasi-concave and weakly monotone on the non-negative orthant of Euclidean n-space. Let c(·, ·) be the associated cost function. Then it is shown that f is concave if and only if for each w, c(w, ·) is convex.     

The Delphi method, impeachment and terrorism: Accuracies of short-range forecasts for volatile world events

Two experiments examined the effects of iterated polling and feedback on prediction accuracy for volatile world events using the Delphi paradigm. In both experiments, participants predicted rapidly changing geopolitical events. The first experiment occurred during the litigation surrounding the Clinton/Lewinsky affair in 1998. Results indicated that feedback improved individual and group accuracy for predictions of whether an event would occur. These types of predictions derived from group consensus were approximately 90% accurate, which was significantly higher than the average individual participant's accuracy. Neither polling nor feedback had much effect on time course predictions. The second experiment occurred during the American military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In Experiment 2, participants were polled three times to determine if increasing the number of iterated polls would improve Delphi accuracy. The results showed that accuracy improved from the first to the second poll but not from the second to the third. The groups predicted whether these scenarios would occur with approximately 75% accuracy, which was significantly higher than the accuracy of any individual participant. Once again, the Delphi procedure did not enhance time course predictions in Experiment 2.