Covered interest arbitrage in the 1970's

This paper provides an empirical overview on covered interest arbitrage during the flexible exchange rate regime of the 1970's. It estimates the cost of transactions in foreign exchange and security markets and shows that these costs account for most of the deviations from parity.     

An examination of firms’ responses to tax forgiveness

This study uses state tax amnesties to examine how firms respond to forgiveness—particularly repeated forgiveness—by a taxing authority. We posit that tax forgiveness programs alter taxpayer perceptions of the probability of detection by enforcers or the probability of future forgiveness programs, either of which could affect future tax aggressiveness. We find that firms headquartered in an amnesty-granting state increase state income tax aggressiveness following the first instance of tax amnesty, relative to control firms in other states. Moreover, we find evidence that tax aggressiveness incrementally increases with each additional repetition of a tax amnesty. Finally, we find that the effect of amnesties on tax aggressiveness is more prominent for small firms, which face less scrutiny and for which the tax aggressiveness measures are less confounded. Our findings suggest that repeated programs of tax forgiveness have increasingly negative implications for corporate tax collections.     

The best of all possible worlds: unraveling target price optimism using analysts’ scenario-based valuations

We document that the relative placement of analysts’ target price within their subjective distribution of scenario-based valuations for the covered firm (i.e., tilt) is informative to investors. When analysts forecast price appreciation, tilt incrementally predicts ex post valuation errors and realized returns; the predictive value of tilt disappears when analysts forecast price declines. In additional analyses, we find that tilt appears to reflect an optimistic bias in target price forecasts as opposed to information about asymmetric state-contingent risk payoffs. Finally, we document that investors can use estimates of implied tilt based on observable firm characteristics to distinguish between investments with equally optimistic target price forecasts, yet lacking scenario-based information.     

Audit firms face downward-sloping demand curves and the audit market is far from perfectly competitive

We discuss the discrete choice demand estimation methods applied by Guo et al. (2017) in the audit setting. We then review insights into audit market competition that demand estimation has already provided. We conclude that the audit market is far from perfectly competitive.     

Solve the succession crisis by growing inside-outside leaders

In his analysis of 1800 successions, Harvard Business School professor Bower found that companies performed significantly better when they appointed insiders to the job of CEO. Other researchers, including Jim Collins in Good to Great, have come to similar conclusions working from different data sets. Yet Bower finds far too many companies have no succession plans; as a result, when the time comes to name a new chief executive, more firms turn to outsiders. Both insider and outsider CEOs have strengths and weaknesses at the start. Insiders know the company and its people but are often blind to the need for radical change. Outsiders see the need for a new approach but can't make the necessary changes because they don't know the organization or industry sector well enough. What companies must do, then, is find a way to nurture what Bower calls inside-outsiders--internal candidates who have outside perspective. Often such executives have spent much of their time away from the mainstream of the organization, and away from headquarters, living with new opportunities and threats. Before becoming CEO, Procter & Gamble's A.G. Lafley, for instance, worked for years building P&G's Chinese cosmetics operation rather than the core detergent business. IBM's Sam Palmisano was a champion of software and open systems at a time when Big Blue was essentially a closed-system, hardware-oriented company. Nascent inside-outsiders should enter the CEO-training process by the time they are 30 and be given the opportunity to manage a whole business, so that they become good insiders. But they also need to be mentored with an eye toward preserving their outsider perspective, so they learn how to turn their new ideas into great businesses and are protected from old-timers who might be inclined to teach them a lesson.     

Can Short Restrictions Actually Increase Informed Short Selling?

We use the 2008 short selling regulations to test whether short sale restrictions can increase informed short selling. For the preborrow requirement, we find more negative price reactions to short interest announcements though no reliable increase in the price impact of short sales volume. For the stocks with banned short sales, we find an increase in the price impact of short sale volume though no reliable change in the price reaction to short interest announcements. Both restrictions, however, are associated with increased informed trading. Our results suggest that short restrictions will not reduce informed short selling and may actually result in an increase by increasing the proportion of informed short sellers..     

Exploring the role Delaware plays as a domestic tax haven

We examine whether Delaware is a domestic tax haven. We find that taxes play an economically important role in determining whether U.S. firms locate subsidiaries in Delaware and that a Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategy lowers state effective tax rates by between 0.7 and 1.1 percentage points, on average. The tax savings represent a 15–24% decrease in the state income tax burden and translate to an increase in net income of 1.04–1.47%. However, we find that the tax benefits of Delaware tax strategies are diminishing over time in response to initiatives by state governments to limit multistate tax avoidance.     

Impression management,myth creation and fabrication in private social and environmental reporting: Insights from Erving Goffman

This paper explores the nature of private social and environmental reporting (SER). From interviews with UK institutional investors, we show that both investors and investees employ Goffmanesque, staged impression management as a means of creating and disseminating a dual myth of social and environmental accountability. The interviewees’ utterances unveil private meetings imbued with theatrical verbal and physical impression management. Most of the time, the investors’ shared awareness of reality belongs to a Goffmanesque frame whereby they accept no intentionality, misrepresentation or fabrication, believing instead that the ‘performers’ (investees) are not intending to deceive them. A shared perception that social and environmental considerations are subordinated to financial issues renders private SER an empty encounter characterised as a relationship-building exercise with seldom any impact on investment decision-making. Investors spoke of occasional instances of fabrication but these were insufficient to break the frame of dual myth creation. They only identified a handful of instances where intentional misrepresentation had been significant enough to alter their reality and behaviour. Only in the most extreme cases of fabrication and lying did the staged meeting break frame and become a genuine occasion of accountability, where investors demanded greater transparency, further meetings and at the extreme, divested shares. We conclude that the frontstage, ritualistic impression management in private SER is inconsistent with backstage activities within financial institutions where private financial reporting is prioritised. The investors appeared to be in a double bind whereby they devoted resources to private SER but were simultaneously aware that these efforts may be at best subordinated, at worst ignored, rendering private SER a predominantly cosmetic, theatrical and empty exercise.