Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions

We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on transient rather than steady state behavior. When arrival times are endogenous, the resulting interactive decision process is modeled as a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information. Assuming discrete strategy spaces, the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for groups of n = 20 agents is computed using a Markov chain method. Using a 2 × 2 between-subject design (private vs. public information by short vs. long service time), arrival and staying out decisions are presented and compared to the equilibrium predictions. The results indicate that players generate replicable patterns of behavior that are accounted for remarkably well on the aggregate, but not individual, level by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution unless congestion is unavoidable and information about group behavior is not provided.JEL Classification: C71, C92, D81     

Multidimensional generalized Gini indices

Summary. The axioms that characterize the generalized Gini social evaluation orderings for one-dimensional distributions are extended to the multidimensional attributes case. A social evaluation ordering is shown to have a two-stage aggregation representation if these axioms and a separability assumption are satisfied. In the first stage, the distributions of each attribute are aggregated using generalized Gini social evaluation functions. The functional form of the second-stage aggregator depends on the number of attributes and on which version of a comonotonic additivity axiom is used. The implications of these results for the corresponding multidimensional indices of relative and absolute inequality are also considered.Received: 20 August 2003, Revised: 26 May 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D63. Correspondence to: John A. WeymarkWe are grateful to our referee for his or her comments.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

Unit and Fractional Roots at the Long Run and the Seasonal Frequencies in Macroeconomic Time Series

In this article, we show that macroeconomic time series may contain unit and fractional roots at both, at zero and at zero and at the seasonal frequencies. The importance of the root at the long run or zero frequency requires in many cases to consider this root at both, separately in an independent polynomial, and also included in the seasonal one. Several Monte Carlo experiments are conducted to examine cases when the root at the zero frequency is not appropriately considered. An empirical application based on the tests of Robinson, Peter M. “Efficient Tests of Nonstationary Hypotheses,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 89, 1994, pp. 1420–37 is also carried out at the end of the article.The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Government of Navarra (“Ayudas de Formación e Investigación y Desarrollo”).     

Economic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects

Summary. We construct an OLG model with network effects to examine skill obsolescence when individuals can choose technological vintages. In the absence of transfer payments, some regions of the parameter space have unique stationary equilibria, others have unique cyclical equilibria, and others have multiple stationary equilibria. All equilibria are Pareto efficient. However, rat race equilibria can exist in which all agents currently alive prefer a slower rate of progress than occurs in equilibrium. When contemporaneous transfers are allowed, equilibria are unique everywhere, but a cycle still exists, and a rat race can still arise in equilibrium. Allowing intertemporal transfers (debt) ensures that all equilibria are stationary. In the relevant parameter range, the introduction of debt can eliminate cycles and increase the long-run growth rate. No rat race equilibria exist when debt is allowed.Received: 3 January 2002, Revised: 3 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: 041, J24, O33. Correspondence to: Ian P. KingEarly versions of this paper were presented at the West Coast Macro Workshop, the Mid-West Macro Meetings, the Canadian Macroeconomics Study Group Meetings, and the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings. We would like to thank V. V. Chari, Merwan Engineer, Don Ferguson, John Hillas, John Knowles, Dan Peled, Dan Usher, Linda Welling and Julian Wright for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for some very useful and substantive comments.     

Competitive Neutrality in Access Pricing

This article examines the notion of competitive neutrality when setting access prices for vertically integrated bottleneck networks. In contrast to the claims of regulated firms (for example, Telstra), it is not possible to argue that access charges that involve unit prices in excess of short‐run marginal cost reflect competitive neutrality. That is, we demonstrate that in general models of downstream oligopoly, upstream prices that differ from marginal cost are not competitively neutral in the sense of placing integrated and non‐integrated firms on an equal basis.     

Property Right and Organizational Characteristics of Producer‐owned Firms and Organizational Trust

Abstract ** :  We examine how organizational characteristics of producer‐owned firms are correlated with the level of perceived trust among cooperative members, using survey data from a sample of U.S. agricultural cooperatives. Our results indicate trust is correlated with property right and organizational structures previously identified in the literature as significant for cooperative performance. We find that the norm of equality and the homogeneity of member interests are key correlates of organizational trust in producer‐owned firms. We also find that some property right structures that improve organizational trust are counterproductive for member investment incentives .     

Unbalanced growth

Abstract.  We study a model designed to understand the concept of unbalanced growth. We define leading sectors to be those that raise the profits from industrialization for other sectors the most. We identify the leading sectors and show that subsidizing them in sequence will raise welfare if the future is not discounted too strongly.     

Control of SO2 emissions from power plants: A case of induced technological innovation in the U.S.

This paper investigates how the details of government actions induce innovation—the overlapping activities of invention, adoption and diffusion, and learning by doing—in “environmental technology,” products and processes that either control pollutant emissions or prevent emissions altogether. It applies multiple quantitative and qualitative measures of innovation to a case subject to several “technology-push” and “demand-pull” instruments: sulfur dioxide control technology for power plants. The study employs analyses of public R&D funding, patents, expert interviews, learning curves, conference proceedings, and experience curves. Results indicate that: regulation and the anticipation of regulation stimulate invention; technology-push instruments appear to be less effective at prompting invention than demand-pull instruments; and regulatory stringency focuses inventive activity along certain technology pathways. Increased diffusion of the technology results in significant and predictable operating cost reductions in existing systems, as well as notable efficiency improvements and capital cost reductions in new systems. Government plays an important role in fostering knowledge transfer via technical conferences, as well as affecting the pattern of collaborative relationships within the technical research community via regulatory changes that affect the market for the technology. Finally, the case provides little evidence for the claim that cap-and-trade instruments induce innovation more effectively than other instruments.